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THE CASE FOR BILLBOARD CONTROL:
PRECEDENT AND PREDICTION
THOMAS GILLIAM
Thomas A. Gilliam received his
B.A. degree from Columbia Uni-
versity in 1941, where he was an
honor scholar. He received his LL.B.
degree from Yale Law School in
1948, and his M.A. degree from
the University of Colorado in 1949.
He has practiced law in Colorado
since 1948, serving as Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney for Denver in 1948,
Assistant Attorney General of Colo-
rado in 1949, Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of
Colorado from 1949 to 1952, and
Assistant City Attorney of Denver
from 1953 to the present. He is
also presently attorney for the Den-
ver Urban Renewal Authority. Mr.
Gilliam has written several law re-
view articles. In 1953 he was pre-
sented the National Municipal Law
Review Award. He is a member of
the American, Colorado and Den-
ver Bar Associations.
The Colorado General Assembly in its next session will prob-
ably again consider legislation' giving the department of highways
jurisdiction over advertising signs outside the corporate limits of
any municipality. In addition, the department is authorized to enter
into agreements with the Secretary of Commerce of the United
States to regulate and control billboards within 660 feet of the right-
of-way of federal-aid highway systems.2 This authorization is de-
signed to meet the requirements of an amendment to the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1956,3 which increases the federal share of the
1 S.B. 150, 42d Colo. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1959) amending art. 5, ch. 120, Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953).
2 S.B. 150, 42d Colo. Assembly, 1st Sess., § 120-5-17 (1959).
3 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958), providing in part as follows:
"(a) . . . It is declared to be a national policy that the erection and maintenance
of outdoor advertising . . . within six hundred and sixty feet of the edge of the right of
way . . . should be regulated, consistent with national standards to be prepared and
promulgated by the Secretary, (of Commerce) which shall include only the following four
types of signs, and no signs advertising illegal activities:
(1) Directional or other official signs or notices that are required or authorized by law.
(2) Signs advertising the sale or lease of the property upon which they are located.
(3) Signs erected or maintained pursuant to authorization or permitted under State law,
and not inconsistent with the national policy and standards of this section, advertising activi-
ties being conducted at a location within twelve miles of the point at which such signs are
located.
(4) Signs erected or maintained pursuant to authorization in state law and not incon-
sistent with the national policy and standards of this section, and designed to give informa-
tion in the specific interest of the traveling public."
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cost of construction, 4 of the interstate highway system to those
states enacting such billboard control legislation 5 and since consid-
erable discussion has arisen as to the constitutionality of this amend-
ment to the Federal Act, and of state enabling legislation, review of
those cases sustaining legislative regulation of billboards seems
appropriate.
Objections usually raised against such regulations are that
they: are invalid as an attempt to impose unreasonable and purely
aesthetic limitations upon the use of private property; are an inva-
sion of personal rights; have no relation to public peace, health,
safety or general welfare; are not zoning ordinances; authorize the
taking of property for public or private use without compensation;
prohibit one type of industry in an area where other types are per-
mitted; and, are even discriminatory as between advertising signs."
Despite these objections, the constitutionality of enactments of
this nature has been sustained. This was not the case, however, at
the turn of the century. Then the courts generally felt that such
laws were an invalid attempt to achieve purposes other than those
traditionally associated with the police power. 7  The first notable
decision breaking from the traditional concept was handed down by
the United States Supreme Court in 1916, in Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago.8 There, the Court held that a city, in the interest
-of the safety, morality and health of the community, may prohibit
the erection of billboards in residential areas. As against a charge
of discrimination, use was made by the court of the then novel con-
cept that a legislature might properly make a reasonable classifica-
tion between structures. The Court reasoned that a legislature could
place billboards, as distinguished from buildings and fences, in a
separate class, upon the ground that they were offensive.9
A remaining question as to whether the holding in the Cusack
case applied only to billboards in residential districts was presented
to the Court in St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis,10
decided in 1918. In the lower court, the plaintiff urged that it had
always complied with valid legislation and had constructed its bill-
boards in a substantial, permanent, safe and workmanlike manner."1
It was further urged that the ordinance was a denial of due process,
4 23 U.S.C. §131 (c) (1958), increases the federal share by one-half of one per cent of the total
cost, a decrease from the five per cent originally proposed, see Hearings on S. 963 Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 5-6; but nevertheless, a consid-
erable amount for a state of the size of Colorado.
5 H.B. 469, also considered by the first session of the 42nd Assembly an insufficient enabling meas-
ure since § 131 (a) (3) of the federal law, note 3, supro, is omitted. And if H.B. 469 is enacted, would
more stringent regulations contained in county zoning laws, enacted pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat., ch.
106, art. 2 (1953) be superseded? See Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
6 See, e.g., complaint, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harter, No. B-19469, District Court, City
and County of Denver, Colorado, September 25, 1958.
7 See Curran Bill Posting Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910); Haskell v. Howard, 269
III. 550, 109 N.E. 992 (1915); Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94
N.E. 920 (1911); City of Chicago v. Gunning, 214 III. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Crawford v. City of
Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476 (1893); City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Advertising and Sign
Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 AtI. 267 (1905); Bill Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58,
AtI. 342 (1904). The Curran case was based upon Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo. 179, 34 Pac. 902 (1893),
which the Colorado court was later to characterize as a "horse and buggy day decision", in Colby v.
Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 353, 255 Pac. 443; 446 (1927).
8 242 U.S. 826 (1916).
9 Id. at 830. Cited as authority for the novel idea was St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St.
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). In the St. Louis case also appears another concept; that the
delegated power to legislate for the general welfare was not confined to those previously ennumerated,
137 S.W. at 943, a concept that the United States Supreme Court was not to adopt until sometime later
in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). Cf.
Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 327, 130 Pac. 828, 831 (1913).
10 249 U.S. 269 (1918).
11 St. Louis Poster Advertising Company v. St. Louis, 195 S.W. 717, 718 (Mo. 1917).
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because the prescribed maximum size was too small to be produced
on standard sign fabricating machinery, and the machinery could
not be changed without disastrously affecting the business. 12 The
plaintiff pointed out that the fee for sign permits was more than
five hundred times that exacted for other structures such as build-
ings, and argued in addition that the ordinance unreasonably im-
posed the same limitations upon advertising structures in the open
and unsettled parts of the city as were imposed in the downtown
and thickly settled portions.13 Despite these arguments, however,
and even though nothing in the ordinance limited its application to
a residential area, the United States Supreme Court held that these
questions had already been settled:
"If the city desired to discourage billboards by a high
tax we know of nothing to hinder, even apart from the right
to prohibit them altogether asserted in the Cusack Co. case
.... In view of our recent decision we think further argu-
ment unnecessary to show that the ordinance must be
upheld.'
14
Thus, the Supreme Court extended the Cusack doctrine to sanc-
tion what was virtually an absolute prohibition of large billboards.
Since the Court in Cusack had ruled that signs in one area could be
offensive the next step was to uphold comprehensive regulation.
Following Cusack, the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.15 used its billboard decision as precedent to sus-
tain exclusion of certain industries by zoning. In this case Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, sanctioned a zoning
ordinance imposing controls on structures, including billboards, on
a city-wide basis as opposed to controls only in a residence area.
In doing so, this now famous observation was made:
"Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent
that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or
even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected
as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained,
under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons anal-
ogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which,
before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street
railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary
and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency,
for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never
varies, the scope of their application must expand or con-
tract to meet the new and different conditions which are
constantly coming within the field of their operation."'16
Then, in 1930, the Indiana Supreme Court, decided General Out-
door Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis.17 In that case, an ordi-
nance not pertaining to zoning, but which prohibited the operation
or maintenance of any sign within 500 feet of certain parks and
boulevards was held valid. The court observed:
"Under a liberalized construction of the general wel-
12 Id. at 718-19.
13 Ibid.
14 St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1918).
15 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
16 Id. at 387.
17202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1910).
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fare purposes of state and federal Constitutions there is a
trend in the modern decisions (which we approve) to fos-
ter, under the police power, an aesthetic and cultural side of
municipal development-to prevent a thing that offends the
sense of sight in the same manner as a thing that offends
the senses of hearing and smelling .... But this trend must
be kept within reasonable limitations, for citizens must not
be compelled under the police power to give up rights in
property solely for the attainment of aesthetic objects."' 8
The court went on to say, however, that aesthetic considerations
enter into the police power to a great extent where a regulation
thereunder has a reasonable relation to the general welfare,19 and
continued:
"As social relations become more complex, restrictions
on individual rights become more common. Restrictions
which years ago would have been deemed intolerable and
in violation of the property owners' constitutional rights are
now desirable and necessary, and zoning ordinances fair in
their requirements are usually sustained .... A prepon-
derant majority of the courts of the several states have
upheld the-validity of the so-called city planning or zoning
laws .... Under laws and ordinances of this character many
regulations and limitations of structural design and prop-
erty use have been upheld which bear no closer relation to
the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare, or
public comfort, convenience, and prosperity (which latter
terms are also included in the recent cases ... ), than does
the ordinance concerning billboards in the instant case. .. "20
The court then concluded, citing the earlier decisions opposing
its view, saying:
"Most of these cases were decided prior to the complete
development of the law concerning the regulation of bill-
boards, and all of them were decided prior to the decision
of the many cases approving the so-called zoning laws....
[Ilt is reasonable to presume that, if cases where laws and
ordinances sought to prohibit billboards within close prox-
imity to public parks and boulevards were to be decided
today in those states, they would reach the same result...
as is reached in the case at bar."
2 1
The courts have continued to authorize the control of billboards
by laws other than those controls imposed by zoning. Such a law
was held valid in Utah, in State v. Packer Corp.22 In this case, how-
ever, there was a distinction between advertising signs, a factor
which had not heretofore been presented. The statute involved pro-
hibited display of tobacco advertising. The statute, however, per-
mitted two exceptions: (1) a tobacco dealer might have a sign in
18 172 N.E. at 312.
19 Ibid. And see International Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 90 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1956); Ware v.
City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923); People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485,
487 (1930) (Opinion by Cardozo, J.: "One of the unsettled questions of the law is the extent to which
the concept of nuisance may be enlarged by legislation so as to give protection to sensibilities that
are merely cultural or aesthetic."); Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 27, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); Annots., 81
A.L.R. 1547 (1932); 58 A.L.R.2d 1314, 1327 (1956).
20 172 N.E. at 313.
21 172 N.E. at 315.
22 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 (1931).
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the front of his place of business, and (2) newspaper or magazine
tobacco ads were permitted. Opposing argument was grounded
upon the provisions in the constitution of Utah guaranteeing the
inalienable rights of citizens and due process of law, and those pro-
hibiting legislation which impaired the obligation of contracts.
2 3
The attack was also based upon the clauses in the federal constitu-
tion relating to interstate commerce, the obligation of contracts, the
abridgement of privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states, and upon the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. 24 When the statute was upheld by the
Utah Supreme Court, appeal was taken to the United States Su-
preme Court in Packer Corp. v. Utah.25 There Mr. Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court, justified the exceptions briefly as follows:
"It is a reasonable ground of classification that the
State has power to legislate with respect to persons in cer-
tain situations and not with respect to those in a different
one.... "26
Brandeis continued, however, adopting a new line of reasoning to
sustain restrictions directly against billboards:
"Moreover, as the state court has shown, there is a
difference which justifies the classification between display
advertising and that in periodicals or newspapers: 'Bill-
boards, street car signs, and placards and such are in a class
23 297 Pac. at 1014.
24 Ibid.25 285 U.S. 105 (1931).
26 Id. at 110.
efficiently.
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by themselves. They are wholly intrastate, and the restric-
tions apply without discrimination to all in the same class.
Advertisements of this sort are constantly before the eyes
of observers on the streets and in street cars to be seen
without the exercise of choice or volition on their part.
Other forms of advertising are ordinarily seen as a matter
of choice on the part of the observer. The young people as
well as the adults have the message of the billboard thrust
upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can produce.
In the case of newspapers and magazines, there must be
some seeking by the one who is to see and read the adver-
tisement. The radio can be turned off, but not so the bill-
board or street car placard. These distinctions clearly place
this kind of advertisement in a position to be classified so
that regulations or prohibitions may be imposed upon all
within the class. This is impossible with respect to news-
papers and magazines.'"27
It must be pointed out, however, that while this may explain
why billboard advertisements may be treated differently from those
in publications, it still does not explain, perhaps, why signs adver-
tising a business conducted on the premises might be exempted. The
latter, of course, have as much involuntary impact upon the public
as do billboards. Since this decision, though, such an exemption has
appeared quite frequently in the cases. One such case is General
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 28 decided
in Masschusetts.
In that state, because an earlier case2 9 had declared billboard
regulation unconstitutional, an amendment to the state constitution
had been deemed necessary to allow regulation of advertising on
public ways, in public places and on private property. Statutes had
been enacted giving to the state department of public works the
power to issue regulations, and to cities and towns the power to
regulate and restrict billboards. The statutes generally prohibited
advertising devices on private property within public view, except
those advertising a nearby business. Regulations had also been en-
acted requiring a setback of 300 feet for certain types of billboards
from the boundary line of certain public ways and places (including
the Boston Common). These proscriptions were disputed by the
advertising company in fifteen equity suits as: (1) being beyond
the scope of the constitutional amendment, in that to regulate and
to restrict does not include the right to prohibit altogether; and,
(2) violative of the federal constitution, particularly the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.30 In a general dis-
cussion of the issues, the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed:
"The zoning ordinance which was held to be valid in
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,... absolutely prohibit-
ed billboards in several of the zones.... in one of the most
recent discussions of the extent of the police power, Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 . . . occurs this language:
27 Ibid.
28 289 Mass. 189, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); and see Gardner, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision, 49
Harvard L. Rev. 869 (1936).
29 Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905).
30 193 N.E. at 803.
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'The guaranty of due process, as has often been held, de-
mands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained.... The court has repeatedly sustained curtailment
of enjoyment of private property, in the public interest.
The owner's rights may be subordinated to the needs of
other private owners whose pursuits are vital to the para-
mount interests of the community. The state may control
the use of property in various ways; may prohibit advertis-
ing billboards except of a prescribed size and location,
certain kinds of advertising . . . .' "31
Then, in answer to the plaintiff's argument that regulation does not
mean prohibition, the court replied:
"The power 'To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States' is conferred upon Con-
gress by article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States.
It was said respecting that power in United States v. Hill,
248 U. S. 420, 425,. . . 'That regulation may take the charac-
ter of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the
decisions of this court.'...-32
The court also felt constrained to use again the zoning analogy: "It
is in substance exclusion of billboards and advertising devices by
zoning.
'33
And, in answer to plaintiff's argument for equal protection, the
court concluded:
"The record, in our opinion, fails to.show that the plain-
tiffs have not been accorded the equal protection of the
laws. The classification of billboards and other outdoor
devices for advertising, when carried on as a business, to be
treated separately and apart from other business plainly is
warranted. . . . The exempted signs do not contain any
element of favoritism. The rules and regulations on their
face are equal and operate indiscriminately. The statute
exempts signs and devices advertising the person occupying
or the business conducted on the premises .... There is a
fundamental difference between these classes of advertising
and the business of advertising as carried on by the plain-
tiffs."3 4
A final answer to this was not secured, however, for although
appeals to the Supreme Court were taken, these were dismissed.35
The question continued to be debated in the state courts despite
Packer Corp. v. Utah.36 Thus, in Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick,37 a Vermont
zoning case, it was urged that extending greater privileges to an
advertiser not engaged in the business of outdoor advertising was to
deny to one so engaged the equal protection of the law and to deny
due process of law. In overruling these contentions, the Vermont
31 Id. at 826-27.
32 Id. at 804.
33 Id. at 816.
34 Id. at 828.
35 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hoar, 296 U.S. 543 (1935); Id., 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
36 285 U.S. 105 (1931), discussed in text at notes 22-27 supra.
37 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943).
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court cited cases reflecting the reasoning of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in the Packer case:
"It is necessary to consider the exact nature of the
plaintiff's alleged property rights which it claims have been
invaded. It is obvious that something more is claimed than
the mere right to erect and maintain billboard structures
upon lands adjacent to the highway. In its essence the right
that is claimed is to use the public highway for the purpose
of displaying advertising matter. This fact has been well
stated by the Phillippine Supreme Court which has said
that 'the success of billboard advertising depends not so
much upon the use of private property as it does upon the
use of the channels of travel used by the general public.
Suppose that the owner of private property ... should re-
quire the advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards
so that they would face the interior of the property instead
of the exterior. Billboard- advertising would die a natural
death if this were done, and its real dependency not upon
the unrestricted use of private property but upon the un-
restricted use of the public highways is at once apparent.
Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole
value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thor-
oughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of bill-
boards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of
private property as it is a regulation of the use of the
streets and other public thoroughfares.' Churchill and Tail
v. Rafferty, 32 P.I. 580, 609, appeal dismissed 248 U.S. 591.
• . . In General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Department of Public
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 168, 169, 193 N.E. 799, 808, it is said:
'The only real value of a sign or billboard lies in its prox-
imity to the public thoroughfare within public view....
The object of outdoor advertising in the nature of things is
to proclaim to those who travel on highways and who resort
to public reservations that which is on the advertising de-
vice, and to constrain such persons to see and comprehend
the advertisement .... In this respect the plaintiffs are not
exercising a natural right, . . . they are seizing for private
benefit an opportunity created for a quite different purpose
by the expenditure of public money in the construction of
public ways .... The right asserted is not to own and use
• Typing * Duplicating
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* Transcription 0 Autotyping
0 Stenotype Dictation
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land or property, to live, to work, or to trade. While it may
comprehend some of these fundamental liberties, its main
feature is the super-added claim to use private land as a
vantage ground from which to obtrude upon all the public
traveling upon highways, whether indifferent, reluctant,
hostile or interested, an unescapable propaganda concern-
ing private business with the ultimate design of promoting
patronage of those advertising. Without this super-added
claim, the other rights would have no utility in this con-
nection.' ,38
The court concluded:
"That the Legislature has seen fit to extend these
privileges cannot avail this plaintiff. They are a matter of
sufferance rather than of right. The plaintiff is admittedly
not in the excepted class, but is, rather, seeking to use the
highway for commercial purposes analogous to the use
made of it by common carriers. Such use, this Court has
held, the Legislature in the exercise of its police powers
may wholly deny, or may permit to some and deny to others
as will best promote the general good of the public. There
is no inherent right to use the highways for commercial
purposes. . . .This is in accord with the holdings of the
United States Supreme Court which has recently said:
'Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue
a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such
activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right
of user, are matters for legislative judgment. The question
is not whether the legislative body may interfere with the
harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must
permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable in-
vasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the
highways by the people in fulfillment of the public use to
which streets are dedicated.' . . . 39
The free use by the people of their highways has thus be-come
since the Packer decision an additional basis for sanctioning bill-
board control. Another instance of this is found in Murphy Inc. v.
Town of Westport.40 In this case, a zoning ordinance divided West-
port, Connecticut, into residential and business districts. In residen-
tial districts, all advertising signs were forbidden except those, no
more than eight square feet, which advertised a business on the
premises. In business districts, billboards were prohibited unless
they referred to a business conducted on the property. The plaintiff
was permitted to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance by the lower
court, but the case was remanded on appeal for a determination of
whether the plaintiffs were entitled to such relief. The appeal court
prefaced its decision with the observation that the Boston Post Road
traversed the business district of Westport. Also, it was held that
38 30 A.2d at 529. See also Wilson, Billboards and the Right to be Seen from the Highway, 30 Geo.
L. J. 723 (1942), and Comment, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 128 (1943).
39 Id. at 530. The case referred to is Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
40 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
SACHS-LAWLOR- CORPOR ATIOn SEALS- ALPInE 5-3422
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it was not discriminatory to treat those signs relating to a business
on the property differently from signs not so related.
If the reasoning contained in the Packer case for such classifica-
tion between signs still remained obscure, the distinction was drawn
in more detail in Railway Express Agency v. New York. 41 This
decision concerned a traffic regulation which prohibited any adver-
tising vehicle from being operated on city streets, but permitted
business notices upon delivery vehicles engaged in the usual busi-
ness of the owner. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, the United
States Supreme Court held that such regulation did not violate the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court explained why a sign advertising a business on
the premises where the sign is located may be exempted from pro-
hibition as follows:
"The question of equal protection of the laws is pressed
more strenuously on us. It is pointed out that the regulation
draws the line between advertisements of products sold by
the owner of the truck and general advertisements. It is
argued that unequal treatment on the basis of such a dis-
tinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the regu-
lation. It is said, for example, that one of the appellant's
trucks carrying the advertisement of a commercial house
would not cause any greater distraction of pedestrians and
vehicle drivers than if the commercial house carried the
same advertisement on its own truck. Yet the regulation
allows the latter to do what the former is forbidden from
doing. It is therefore contended that the classification
which the regulation makes has no relation to the traffic
problem since a violation turns not on what kind of adver-
tisements are carried on trucks but on whose trucks they
are carried.
"That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the
problem, even if we assume that it is premised on the cor-
rect construction of the regulation. The local authorities
may well have concluded that those who advertised their
own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic
problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising
which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience
which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judg-
ment is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt
have less incidence on traffic than those of appellants."
42
The court concluded:
"The fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from
traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may
be even greater ones in a different category, such as the
vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no re-
quirement of equal protection that all evils of the same
genus be eradicated or none at all.
'43
Mr. Justice Brennan while a member of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court further clarified the stand of the courts on this issue in
41336 U.S. 106 (1948); see also Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911).
42 Id. at 109-10.
43 Id. at 110.
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United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan.44 In this instance,
a zoning ordinance excluded signs, other than those advertising a
business on the premises, from all of the zoned districts of the bor-
ough, whether residential, business, or industrial. The court said:
"The business sign is in actuality a part of the business
itself, just as the structure housing the business is a part of
it, and the authority to conduct the business in a district
carries with it the right to maintain a business sign on the
premises subject to reasonable regulations in that regard
as in the case of this ordinance. Plaintiff's placements of its
advertising signs, on the other hand, are made pursuant to
the conduct of the business of outdoor advertising itself,
and in effect what the ordinance provides is that this busi-
ness shall not to that extent be allowed in the borough.
It has long been settled that the unique nature of outdoor
advertising and the nuisances fostered by billboards and
similar outdoor structures located by persons in the busi-
ness of outdoor advertising, justify the separate classifica-
tion of such structures for the purposes of governmental
regulation and restriction....
"And as such separate classification offends no consti-
tutional provision, there also exists no invidious discrim-
ination in the provisions of the ordinance barring plaintiff's
signs in the business and industrial zones while allowing
therein manufacturing plants, junk yards, coal and coke
yards and other uses suggested by plaintiff, as also having
undesirable attributes. It is enough that outdoor advertis-
ing has characteristic features which have long been
deemed sufficient to sustain regulations or prohibitions
peculiarly applicable to it."
45
Then, as a synthesis, a recent case, City of Los Angeles v. Bar-
rett,46 sustained an enactment which combines the alternative rea-
sons for control authored by Brandeis (outdoor advertising may be
restricted because, unlike other forms of advertising, it cannot be
avoided) ,47 and Douglas (selective determination by local author-
ities that a sign not advertising a personal business is a pedestrian
and vehicular distraction) .48 Here an ordinance provided that no
outdoor advertising structure (defined to exclude premises-identify-
ing signs of limited dimensions) could be erected or maintained if:
(1) it was designed to have its advertising primarily viewed from a
freeway, or (2) its location, size, nature or type constituted or tend-
ed to constitute a hazard to the safe and efficient operation of
vehicles or to the safety of persons or property. It was further pro-
vided that no permit should be issued if it were determined by the
local public works board that a proposed billboard was designed
primarily to be viewed from such freeway, and that every applica-
tion for a permit to erect such structure within 500 feet of any free-
way must be approved by this board. 49 While this case was inter-
locutory in nature, sustaining a preliminary injunction against the
44 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
45 93 A.2d at 365-66.
46 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
47 Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1931), discussed in text, notes 22-27 supra.
48 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948), discussed in text, notes 41-43 supra.
49 City of Los Angeles v. Barrett, 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503, 504-05 (1957).
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defendant's placing a sign adjacent to a freeway, it is illustrative
of the type of laws now coming into existence with the growth of
limited-access urban highways. California, for example, prohibits
the placing or maintaining of advertising displays on any property
adjacent to landscaped freeways (except those advertising busi-
nesses conducted on the premises).50 Similar statutes are found in
Maryland 5' and Vermont.52
II
As a collateral inquiry, but no less important, possible effects
upon freedom of speech and of the press must be considered in con-
nection with the regulation of roadside advertising. Danger to these
liberties, however, was not thought to be present in United Adver-
tising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan,5 where it was said:
"Plaintiff urges further that there is an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of the guaranties of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press in a distinction which permits a
business man to use a sign to advertise his business upon
the premises, although 'he may not use that same sign to
urge the public to purchase an automobile or a particular
brand of ice cream or any other lawful article of commerce,
at a store he owns across the street.' The short answer to
this is that these guaranties impose no such restraint upon
governmental regulations of purely commercial advertis-
ing.,,
54
The billboard industry's answer, however, is that by the inclu-
sion of many posters on behalf of civic and national programs, its
medium is not of a purely commercial nature since the public serv-
ices it renders are vital to the nation, its states and its communities. 55
And, indeed, there would appear, in view of this development,
serious difficulty of apportioning for legitimate regulation, that
which is of public interest and that which is for private profit.
Nevertheless, the industry, although its public service is of great
magnitude, probably may not rely on the first amendment. Other-
wise, as the United States Supreme Court has observed in Valentine
v. Christensen,56 an occasional civic appeal could achieve immunity
from the law's command.
Additional inquiry must also be made as to whether the inclu-
sion of provisions against the remodeling of signs existing prior to a
regulation's enactment may be unconstitutional. In zoning laws,
however, "the customary method of eliminating non-conforming
existing uses is to forbid any alterations or rebuilding. '57 More-
over, legislation which prohibits the maintenance and use of existing
billboards has been upheld. In Kansas City Gunning Advertising'
50 Cal. Businesl; and Professions Code, §§5291-93.
51 8 Ann. Cadebf Md., art. 89B (1958).
52 Vt. Laws 288 (1957).
53 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
54 93 A.2d at 366.
55 See, e.g., Hearings, op. cit. supra note 5 at 195-96.
56 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
57 Comment, 39 Yale L.J. 735 (1930).
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Co. v. Kansas City,58 a state case later cited with approval by the
United States Supreme Court,59 it was pointed out:
"This was an ordinance in pursuance of the police
power of the city and enacted upon an adequate showing of
public necessity. Such ordinances are enforceable, when
otherwise valid, in praesenti as well as in futuro. They do
not in a legal sense take the property of persons against
whom they are directed. They simply regulate the use of
such property by prohibiting its injurious or criminal use
by the owner, and hence they do not offend (as claimed by
plaintiff) any provision of the organic law protecting vest-
ed interests or inhibiting retrospective legislation. This is
typified by the provisions of the ordinance under review.
None of them either in words or by intendment deprived
the plaintiff of the use of any of its property prior to the
adoption of the ordinance. They merely require it and all
others similarly situated to refrain from the use or main-
tenance of their property after the passage of the ordinance,
in a manner which that enactment conclusively determines
to be unlawful and injurious."60
And in the St. Louis Advertising Co. v. St. Louis decision, wherein
an injunction was denied against the city's removal of the plaintiff's
signs, it was concluded by the United States Supreme Court:
"As to the plaintiff's contracts, so far as appears, they
were made after the ordinance was passed; but if made
before it they were subject to legislation not invalid other-
wise than for its incidental effect on them.
61
And in Packer Corp. v. Utah,62 a conviction was again sustained by
the United States Supreme Court against a billboard company
which maintained and used an existing tobacco sign, in defiance
of a statute.
III
Can a prediction, then, be made as to the future of enabling
legislation in Colorado? It would seem that since no violation of
the fourteenth amendment results from special legislation regulat-
ing billboards as contrasted with other structures 63 and other forms
of advertisements, 64 probably no discrimination exists in contraven-
tion of the similar protection afforded by the state constitution.
6 5
So also, if there is no denial of the right of freedom of speech and
of the press as guaranteed by the federal constitution, which guar-
anty is made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment,66 there should be no denial of freedom of speech and press
under article II, section 10, of the state constitution. Similarly, if
sign control is not a taking of property under the fourteenth
58 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912).
59 St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274 (1918).
60 144 S.W. at 1103-04.
61 249 U.S. at 274.
62 285 U.S. 105 (1931).
63 Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1931), discussed in text at notes 22-27 supra; Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948), discussed in text at notes 41-43 supra.
64 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 826 (1916), discussed in text at notes 8-9
supra.
65 Colo. Consi., art. V. §25.
66 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942).
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amendment,67 then it is probably not a taking of property as is
prohibited in Colorado. 8 Even if a law contains provisions against
the continued use and maintenance of non-conforming signs, since
the federal constitution does not stand in the way,69 it would seem
there would also result no violation of the state's organic law.7"
And, if property rights, contractual and otherwise, and other privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, are not violated, then there would
appear to be no deprivation of inalienable or reserved rights as
protected by a state constitution.
71
On the other hand, in any prediction that is essayed, it must be
remembered that the signboard industry has brightened our urban
centers. Humor and art are displayed upon the familiar panels.
In their maintenance and placing, employment to many families is
afforded. Their commercial advertisement is a stimulus to an ex-
panding economy. Political parties lease the boards to present
candidates to one of the few remaining free societies in the world.
So while it appears that the power to regulate billboards is consti-
tutionally sanctioned to perhaps a surprising extent, the prediction
would also have it that such power will be tempered with equity.
67 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 826 (1916); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285
U.S. 105 (1931); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948).
68 Colo. Const., art. II, §14 (taking private property for private use); §15 (taking property for public
use); §25 (due process of low).
69 See Packer Corp. v. Utah 285, U.S. 105 (1931).
70 Colo. Const., art. II, §1 as to legislation which is ex post facto or impairs the obligation of
contracts.
71 State v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 (1931).
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Billboards and other outdoor advertising signs are adjuncts of
trade and commerce. They have a proper and necessary place in the
industrial and commercial areas of the country. Reputable sign
companies and advertisers have long recognized that signs are out
of place in residential, scenic or recreational areas, and have in-
cluded in their association codes of ethics prohibitions against the
erection of signs in or adjacent to such areas.1
No useful purpose would be served by a detailed examination
of the many and conflicting decisions of courts of last resort on the
validity of prohibitions and restrictions on outdoor signs. Two prin-
cipal lines of conflicting decisions will be noticed, but, in general,
this discussion will be limited to the rights of property owners,
advertisers and sign companies to erect and maintain outdoor ad-
vertising signs, including billboards, in the business, industrial and
commercial areas of Colorado.
Colorado now has a weak, unenforced and unenforceable road-
side sign law.2 Irresponsible advertisers and sign companies can and
do erect roadside signs, often without permission of the landowner,
and disappear before their acts are discovered. The signs they erect,
unless removed at the property owner's expense, remain, unattend-
ed, to rust and decay and become offensive to passers-by. There are
areas along our highways, commonly called "sign patches," in which
signs are so numerous as to be worthless because each detracts from
1 Public Policy - Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc. (1938). Includes regulations
prohibiting advertising structures within rights-of-way of public roads or upon private property with-
out consent of the owner; upon the inside of curves or in the vicinity of -railroad crossings or road
intersections so as to obstruct the view; or which obstruct beautiful vistas or panoramic view of
natural beauties of rural landscapes; or which encroach upon an historical monument, shrine, relic,
object, or place; or which intrude upon the beauty and dignity of approaches or entrances to notional,
state, or county parks, or on residential streets, facing parks, or on residential streets where resent-
ment of reasonable-minded persons would be justified; or which are not in good physical condition.
These regulations also prohibit signs on rocks, trees, fences, or barricades. They also condemn illegal,
immoral, false, misleading, or deceptive signs.




the value of the others. Signs which offend the sense of propriety of
the viewer are worthless as advertising. Responsible advertisers
and advertising companies have long sought legislation to remedy
this situation,3 realizing the harm that is being done to the
industry by unruly and unlawful elements. A workable, enforceable
law is a necessity, but differences as to the type of law required
have so far proved irreconcilable.
I. CONFLICTING DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
There are two principal lines of decisions on billboards and out-
door advertising signs. One line considers billboards as offensive
land uses and rules that signs may be drastically regulated, pro-
hibited, or taxed out of existence. The other line of decisions
declares that outdoor advertising signs are lawful and may be
regulated under the police power, but cannot be prohibited.
a.) The Minority View:
Signs are Tolerated, But may be Prohibited.
Illustrations of the first line of decisions are found in a number
of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. In these cases,
constitutional objections were raised that the regulation or law in
question authorized the taking of private property for public or
private use without compensation, and constituted a denial of due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.
In Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago,4 the United States Supreme
Court approved the placing of billboards in a classification separate
from that of other commercial and industrial structures on the
ground that they were offensive uses and in the same class as
garages and saloons. This case went beyond the question involved,
namely, the validity of a municipal regulation prohibiting billboards
in the residential areas of Chicago. Later, the same court in St. Louis
Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis,5 decided that if a city desired to
discourage billboards by taxing them at an exorbitant and discrim-
inatory rate, there was nothing to hinder it from so doing.
Still later the same court, in Packer Corp. v. Utah,6 affirmed a
decision of the Supreme Court of Utah which had approved a statute
prohibiting tobacco advertising on billboards, placards and car
cards, but permitting such advertising when contained in a news-
paper or magazine, or on the front of the place of business of a
tobacco dealer. Speaking of billboards and car cards, the court said,
"Advertisements of this sort are constantly before the eyes of ob-
servers on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the
exercise of choice or volition on their part."T This is the "captive
audience" argument.
The reasoning in which the Court indulged to support the dis-
tinction between such signs merits particular comment because it
is contrary to everyday experience. No one is compelled to look at
3 E.g., House Bill 469, 42nd Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959). Outdoor advertising firms
and sign contractors in Colorado collaborated in the drafting of this bill. It died in committee. In
general, this bill required persons erecting and maintaining outdoor signs to be bonded and licensed,
and required annual permits for all outdoor signs. It limited the areas in which such signs could be
erected, and required visibility distances between signs so as to eliminate sign patches. It especially
prohibited signs in scenic, recreational and residential areas, with exemptions for charitable, religious,
officialand similar signs.
4 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
5249 U.S. 269 (1919).
6285 U.S. 105 (1932).
7 Id. at 110.
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billboards. We pass them every day without being aware of their
existence. But even if the court's statements were true, where do
billboards threaten or contravene public peace, public health, public
morals, and public safety? '
In this same decision, the court declared, "In the case of news-
papers and magazines, there must be some seeking by the one who
is to see and read the advertisement."8 Everyday practice indicates
the Court had its facts twisted. In most newspapers and magazines,
the reader must search through the advertisements to find the news
items. Again, the Court says, "The radio can be turned off, but not
so the billboard or street car placard."9 No one turns off a radio or
television in the midst of an interesting program to avoid seeing or
hearing the customary mid-program commercial.
In Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick,l0 the Supreme Court of Vermont said:
"Ostensibly located on private property, the real and
sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public
thoroughfares. Hence, we can see that the regulation of
billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation
of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the
streets and other public thoroughfares.""
Notably absent from the decisions supporting the "proximity
argument" is any discussion on the origin or validity of the assumed
superior right of the highway traveler to have the lands abutting
8 Id. at 110.
9 d at 110.
10 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1942).
11 Id. at 67, 30 A.2d at 529.
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such highways restricted in use so as to please his individual tastes.
Except in scenic, recreational, and similar areas, the primary pur-
pose of a highway is to facilitate travel, and not to please the
aesthete. There are few industries or businesses whose value is not
in part, at least, measured by their proximity to arteries of public
transportation. Yet, under this "proximity argument" and by pre-
tending to regulate highway traffic, every filling station or motel
could be subjected to discriminatory treatment or even prohibited
since, like billboards, their value depends upon travel on public
streets and highways. Based upon the "proximity argument" and
under the guise of regulating sidewalks, all stores on Sixteenth
Street in Denver could be compelled to board up their show win-
dows because the value of show windows lies solely in their prox-
imity to public sidewalks. The "proximity doctrine" has no relation
to the public peace, health, safety, morals, or welfare.1 2
A further argument in support of the prohibition of roadside
advertising signs is that they distract the attention of drivers of
automobiles, and so endanger public safety. A California case, Los
Angeles v. Barrett,1" involved the validity of an ordinance prohibit-
ing outdoor advertising signs visible from a freeway, which created
a hazard to vehicles or endangered the safety of persons on the free-
way. Proponents of the ordinance offered proof regarding the fre-
quency of traffic, the distance in seconds between cars, and the
distance in seconds required to recognize a sign. This proof was
intfoduced to support the contention that by the time a driver of
an automobile read a billboard and turned his attention again to the
road ahead, he would have collided with the car in front of him.
This line of reasoning, sustained by the California court, is open to
serious criticism. For instance, it is common practice for automobile
drivers to keep their eyes on the road and leave the observation of
roadside signs and scenery to passengers. The reasoning in this case
falsely assumes that while the driver is scanning the sign, the car
ahead is illegally slowing down or stopping in the roadway. This
decision also presumes that the driver scanning the sign has no
peripheral vision, which, experience teaches us, is seldom the case.
The extent to which some jurisdictions have gone to prohibit
or restrict outdoor signs is perhaps best illustrated by Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York,'1 4 which concerned a traffic regula-
tion prohibiting any advertising vehicle from being operated on city
streets, but permitting business notices on delivery vehicles engaged
in the business of the owner. This regulation was sustained not be-
cause of its relation to public peace, health or safety, but on the basis
of whose truck was carrying the advertising.
The foregoing decisions are numbered among the more prom-
inent anti-sign authorities. They illustrate how outdoor signs were
first removed by court decree from the general class of commercial
and industrial structures and relegated to a class of activities exist-
ing by sufferance which can claim no constitutional protection.
They further demonstrate how signs themselves were then divided
into signs erected as a part of the advertising business and signs
12 Curran Bill Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
13 153 Col. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
14 336 U.S. 106 (1948).
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accessory to a particular business-the latter being tolerated and
the former being prohibited.
b.) The Majority Rule:
Signs May Be Regulated But Not Prohibited Under the Police Power
The second line of decisions sustains the regulation of outdoor
signs and billboards under the police power, but condemns the
prohibition of such signs. This is the majority rule and is followed
by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
In 1954, the Ohio case of Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Village of Evendale,15 declared unconstitutional a village ordinance
providing that no advertising sign or billboard should be erected
within the limits of the village except to advertise the business or
product of the owner or occupant of the premises on which the sign
was located. The ordinance stated that it was enacted as an emer-
gency measure, necessary to the public safety and welfare. It
announced it was made necessary because signs and billboards
constituted a menace to the lives of travelers on the highways, by
diverting the attention of motor vehicle drivers. The court had this
to say:
"With few exceptions, the rule is well established that
any law is unwarranted and invalid, which prohibits alto-
gether an occupation or business which does not necessarily
injure the public in that it is detrimental to the health,
safety or general welfare. In other words, no trade or occu-
pation can be prohibited absolutely unless it is inherently a
nuisance or has become such. Billboard advertising is not
inherently a nuisance, whether used as* accessory and inci-
dental to the main business conducted on the premises, or
is the exclusive use to which the premises are put."16
The Ohio court also stated that outdoor advertising under the
Ohio code was classified as a business use and permitted in all dis-
tricts zoned for industry, business, trade or agriculture; that the
ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising except for accessory uses,
gave no specific reason for the inhibition, unless the reason could be
found in the term "safety," as used in the preamble of the ordinance.
The court found evidence that these billboards and signs are located
on property so near the highway that they may be seen by those
traveling on the highway. There was also evidence as to the great
amount of traffic on the highways of the defendant village. The
court mentioned the strong presumption in favor of the validity of
an ordinance enacted under a police power, but then held:
"[C]omplete prohibition throughout a municipality of
a conduct of a legitimate business must be based upon the
fact that such business is inherently a nuisance and a detri-
ment to safety, or has become so. A particular business,
recognized by the statutory law of the state as a legitimate
business, cannot be made a nuisance by mere legislative fiat
of the council of a municipality."' 7
The court said there Was no substantial reason for declaring
15 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E.2d 189 (C.P. 1954).
16 Id. at 356, 124 N.E.2d at 193.
17 Id. at 357, 124 N.E.2d at 194.
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billboards and signs, other than those advertising products manu-
factured or sold on the premises, such a menace to life as to require
their prohibition, and concluded:
"Regulations of a business under the police power must
be impartial and must have a real and substantial relation
to the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the
public. This limitation upon the power to regulate obvious-
ly applies to a prohibition of a legitimate business; in fact,
the restrictions upon the power to prohibit are even more
stringent than those upon the power to regulate."'18
An ordinance of the Village of Colonie, New York, prohibiting
the erection of billboards within the village, was declared to be
invalid and an improper exercise of the statutory powers conferred
upon the village trustees to enact ordinances necessary for the pro-
tection of property and life.19 In another New York case, 20 an ordi-
nance of the City of Troy, New York, was challenged. The Troy
ordinance differed from the ordinance in the Village of Colonie case
in that it excepted signs advertising the sale of the property upon
which placed, or of merchandise sold on the premises, but it pro-
hibited all other signs. It was declared void on its face, on the
ground that it was not an attempt by zoning to exclude billboards
from localities where they might mar natural scenery or distract
travelers. The Court of Appeals of New York stated that even
though it be assumed that outdoor advertising on private property
might without compensation be restricted for aesthetic reasons
alone, this prohibition without any definition of the structures pro-
scribed or other standard of regulation, cannot be sustained con-
sistently with constitutional principles.
In 1956, a New York appellate decision 2 1 ruled that. a statute
which prohibited outdoor advertising signs other than those adver-
tising the business conducted on the premises or concerning the sale
of such premises, or which were more than ten (10) feet in height
or within 500 feet of the Brooklyn Battery Bridge, or its approaches
or connections, was unconstitutional. The court noted that "the
statute does not prohibit all signs, but only those referring to a
subject 'other than actually conducted on the premises or to the sale
or rent of such premises'." The court stated that the allegation that
such signs imperiled public peace, safety and health was refuted by
the very exceptions recited in the statute; that while a ban on all
signs might be said to have some reasonable connection with the
police power of the state, nevertheless, since certain signs were
permitted regardless of their size or height or potentialities for dis-
traction, it was apparent that the prohibition was based on factors
that had no relation to the public health. The court concluded that,
"A prohibition which cannot be equated with the evil to be remedied
is arbitrary and unreasonable."
It is pertinent here to point out that the dicta so often encoun-
tered in decisions mentioning the baneful effects of outdoor signs
upon traffic safety have little or no basis in fact. David M. Baldwin,
18 Id. at 358, 124 N.E.2d at 194-95.
19 Ruth v. Incorporated Village of Colonie, 198 Misc. 608, 99 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
20 Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937).
21 Tri-Borough Bridge and Tunnel Authority v. B. Crystal & Son, 2 App. Div. 2d 37, 153 N.Y.S.2d
387 (1956), aff'd 2 N.Y.2d 961, 142 N.E.2d 426 (1957).
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Executive Secretary of the Institute of Traffic Engineers, in an
article entitled "Frankly Speaking" in the official publication of that
Institute, stated in part: 22
"No one denies that a billboard located at an inter-
section or a curve so as to obstruct the view, or a sign which
confuses a driver by its message, color or illumination is a
hazard. On the other hand, there are no facts which show
any hazard resulting from advertising signs in general.
Attempts by opponents of outdoor advertising to assume
such a relationship are unfair and are not condoned by
engineers, who will insist on seeing evidence of any such
relationship.
"This does not mean that traffic engineers favor out-
door advertising. Undoubtedly some do-but certainly
many do not. Their reasons for opposing billboards, if this
is their position, are those of aesthetics or personal opinion,
however, not because there are facts about accidents.
"It is unfortunate that the billboard arguments have
been identified in so many minds as ones which can be re-
solved on the basis of traffic safety. In effect, the oppo-
nents of billboards have tied their case to the coat-tails of
safety. This misleading identification has been confusing to
the general public, which is not aware of the facts of the
case."
And in Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale,23 the
Ohio court stated: "There is no evidence of injuries caused to per-
sons or property by such signs."
Uncontroverted testimony in the case of General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Harter2 4 stated there was no record of a traffic
accident caused by an outdoor advertising sign.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Haller Sign Works
v. Physical Culture Training School,25 stated: "There is nothing
inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in struc-
tures that are properly erected for advertising purposes." In that
case, the Illinois court also said:
"Again, it is to be observed that the application of this
statute is limited to structures placed within five hundred
feet of boulevards and public parks. If the placing of such
structures within five hundred feet of boulevards and pub-
lic parks is dangerous or otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare, it is difficult to see why the same structures would
not be equally so if placed within the same distance from
any other public street or public grounds.
'26
In contrast with the line of decisions prohibiting or drastically
restricting billboards, segregating them from the general classifica-
tion of commercial structures and declaring they exist only by suf-
22 27 Traffic Engineering 311 (1954).
23 54 Ohio Op. 354, 357, 124 N.E.2d 189, 194 (C.P. 1954).
24 No. B.19469, Dist. Ct. City and County of Denver, Colo., Sept. 25, 1958.
25249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911).
26 Id. at 442, 94 N.E. at 922-23.
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ferance, is a recent case in which the Supreme Court of Illinois
said: 2
7
"Statutory classifications can only be sustained where
there are real differences between the classes, and where
the selection of the particular class, as distinguished from
others, is reasonably related to the evils to be remedied by
the statute or ordinance. .. . Similarly, an ordinance cannot
be sustained which permits designated uses of property
while excluding other uses not significantly different."
II. THE COLORADO DECISIONS
As hereinafter shown, the Colorado Supreme Court has fol-
lowed the majority rule that outdoor advertising signs may be
regulated, but not prohibited, under the police power. The following
cases will also show that while our Supreme Court has time and
again approved the validity of proper zoning laws,28 it has con-
demned discrimination in zoning codes between outdoor signs and
other commercial structures in industrial and commercial districts.
29
Colorado statutes empower municipalities to adopt zoning ordi-
nances.30 These statutes also authorize county commissioners to
adopt county zoning resolutions for the unincorporated areas of the
county.31 Zoning resolutions or ordinances, by creating zoning dis-
tricts specifying the uses permitted in such districts, exclude other
27 Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953).
28 DiSalle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo.
344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
29 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 139, art. 60 (1953).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 106, art. 2 (1953).
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uses.3 2 The constitutionality of such ordinances and zoning resolu-
tions has been upheld.3 3 In this discussion, we are concerned with
the prohibition, rather than the regulation, of outdoor advertising
signs, including billboards, under the police power. We are also
concerned with discriminations against outdoor advertising signs
and billboards, or between outdoor advertising signs and billboards,
under the police power or in zoning ordinances or resolutions.
Probably the basic decision in Colorado concerning outdoor
signs and billboards was handed down in 1910 in the case of Curran
Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. Denver.3 4 This case involved an
ordinance prohibiting billboards or advertising structures without a
permit from the fire and police board of Denver. It prohibited a
billboard or advertising structure any portion of which was within
10 feet of any street or alley line, or was more than 25 feet in length
or 8 feet in height, or was within 10 feet of any building. The
following quotations are from the opinion in that case:
"The natural right, one may have, to use his own prop-
erty as he wills, is subject always to the limitation that in
its use, others shall not be injured. That which is hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society may always be
prohibited, under the inherent or plenary power of the
state, notwithstanding the incidental inconvenience of loss
individuals may suffer thereby.
3 5
"It is equally true, however, that the owner of property
has the right to put it to any use he desires, provided in so
doing, he does not imperil or threaten harm to others.
Legislative restrictions of the use of property are imposed
only upon the theory of necessity; that is, they are neces-
sary for the safety, health, comfort or general welfare of
the public.
'" 36
"If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted
to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects,
or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the funda-
mental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution.
3 7
The court commented that no case had been cited authorizing the
taking of a man's property because his tastes were not those of his
neighbor, and then stated:
"The restrictions imposed are not against the material,
the height, the length, nor the location of the structure, but
solely as means of advertisement. It prohibits such struc-
tures without regard to their being safe or sanitary....
In what way can the erection of safe structures, of proper
material, within certain limits, for advertising purposes,
endanger the public health or safety any more than like
structures erected and used for other lawful purposes? If
the owner has the right to erect upon the lot line buildings
32 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code, Sec. 612.1 - .17.
33 DiSolle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo.
344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
34 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
35 Id. at 224, 107 Poe. at 263.
36 Id. at 225, 107 Pac. at 263.
37 Id. at 226, 107 Pac. at 264.
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or other structures of proper material, in a substantial
manner, as he undoubtedly has, it is certainly an unwar-
ranted invasion of his rights to prohibit the erection or use
of such structures for proper advertising purposes. "38
In Willison v. Cooke,39 the court stated that a store building in
a residential section, while not desirable from an aesthetic point of
view, could not be prohibited. Such a prohibition would have no
relation to any object which the municipality in the exercise of its
police power might legally accomplish. The court, in deciding that
such restrictions violated Sections 3, 15 and 25 of the Colorado Bill
of Rights,40 said:
"One of the essential elements of property is the right
to its unrestricted use and enjoyment; and as we have seen,
that use cannot be interfered with beyond what is necessary
to provide for the welfare and general security of the public.
Enforcing the provisions of the ordinances in question does
not deprive the petitioner of title to his lots .... He would
still have the power to dispose of them; but, although there
would be no actual or physical invasion of his possession,
he would be deprived of the right to put them to a legiti-
mate use, which does not injure the public, and this, without
compensation or any provision therefor. This would clearly
deprive him of his property without compensation, and
without due process of law .... 41
While the Curran42 and Willison43 cases were decided prior to
the advent of municipal 44 or county zoning45 in Colorado, the Su-
preme Court of Colorado in Cross v. Bilett,46 involving the validity
of a portion of a Denver zoning ordinance, stated:
"[W]e do not challenge the rule declared in the Curran
and Willison cases. In the absence of a zoning ordinance,
where the right of a municipality is strictly limited to the
general police power for protection of the public health
and welfare, it is commonly held that only such buildings
and occupations may be restricted as are shown to be in-
jurious under such police power; . . . In the absence of
zoning ordinances, restrictions as to use of property are
viewed with hostility by the courts.
47
Again, in 1953, in the case of General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Goodman,48 which questioned the validity of a portion of an Arapa-
hoe County zoning resolution,49 the court held:
38 Id. at 228, 107 Pac. at 264.
39 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
40 Colo. Const. art. II.
41 54 Colo. at 330, 130 Pac. at 832.
42 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
43 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
44 Colo. Sess. Laws 1923, at 649.
45 Colo. Sess. Laws 1939, at 294.
46 122 Colo. 278, 221 P.2d 923 (1950).
47 Id. at 284, 221 P.2d at 926.
48 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
49 Arapahoe County Zoning Resolution, 6, as amended October 23, 1950, reads:
"11. Signs, when approved by the combined action of the Arapahoe County Board of Ad-
justment and the Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County."
In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 346, 262 P.2d 261, 262 (1953)
the court observed:
"To make easy reading in the discussion of the matters herein presented, it is well to ob-
serve at the outset that for some reason, unexplained, the county commissioners singled out
'signs' as objects for different and specific treatment .... Curiosity is naturally aroused
when it is seen that 'signs' are the only commercial structures falling within this unusual pro-
cedure."
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"It would be difficult to find a more direct grant of
arbitrary discretion and unlimited power than is here vest-
ed, and, of course, the freedom to use such power as it
might relate to lawful enterprises and the uses of property,
permits uncontrolled regulation and dictatorial powers of
commercial and industrial enterprises in the area involved
and therefore is repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States and that of the State of Colorado.
'50
This case is noteworthy for several reasons. It is the latest pro-
nouncement of the Colorado Supreme Court on this subject. It is
based upon a zoning code and not upon the general police power.
Contrary to the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court in Cusack v.
Chicago5' and Packer Corp. v. Utah,52 the Colorado Supreme Court
in this case recognized the erection of advertising signs as a lawful
enterprise,53 thus affirming the position taken in the Curran case,
wherein billboards were classed with "like structures erected and
used for other lawful purposes.
54
Under the Goodman decision, 55 there was at least a chance that
the Arapahoe County Commissioners and Board of Adjustment
would refrain from arbitrary action and grant sign permits where
proper. Hence, it would seem that any statutory prohibition of out-
door signs under the police powers of the state, such as that pro-
posed by the amendments to the Federal Interstate Highway Law56
would be invalid. Under this amendment to the Federal Interstate
Highway Law, the prohibition is absolute; it cannot be tempered by
official action. It prohibits all roadside signs with very few excep-
tions and it discriminates between signs.
57
In the Goodman case, the Supreme Court of Colorado adhered
to the general law which requires that regulation of lawful busi-
nesses cannot be had unless the rules are prescribed by the legis-
lature. The supreme court stated:
"The danger . . . lies in the fact that there are no uni-
form rules prescribed, thereby making it possible for arbi-
trary and capricious discriminations, depending upon no
qualifications whatever other than the unrestrained and
unregulated arbitrary will of the members of the two
boards . . ."58
This decision follows Walsh v. Denver,59 LaJunta v. Heath,60 People
v. Stanley,61 and May v. People.2 In the last case, the Colorado
Court of Appeals said:
"If the city council can say that certain individuals
may pursue a certain vocation and that other individuals
of the same class, of equal repute and citizens of that com-
munity, shall not, then the one great principle conferred
upon the citizens of the United States, to wit; the right to
50 128 Colo. 344, 348, 262 P.2d 261, 262. (Emphasis added.)
51 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
52 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
53 128 Colo. at 348, 262 P.2d at 263.
54 47 Colo. 221, 228, 107 Pac. 261, 264 (1910).
55 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
56 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958).
57 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 5131 (a) (1958).
58 128 Colo. at 349, 262 P.2d at 263.
59 11 Cola. App. 523, 53 Pac. 458 (1898).
60 38 Colo. 372, 88 Pac. 459 (1906).
61 90 Colo. 315, 9 P.2d 288 (1932).
62 1 Colo. App. 157, 27 Pac. 1010 (1891).
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pursue any lawful business or vocation in any manner not
inconsistent with the equal rights of others which may in-
crease their prosperity or develop their faculties so as to
give them the highest enjoyment is disallowed.
'6 3
In each of these cases, public officials or the legislative body
were given the right without any rules to guide them, to grant
or to withhold certain privileges or licenses to engage in lawful
businesses. The cases indicate that no sign legislation can be adopt-
ed in this state which, at the very outset, arbitrarily denies to indi-
viduals the right to pursue a lawful business or occupation.
The difference between signs advertising business conducted or
products sold on the premises and those which do not is one of
degree. In the former instance, the proprietor of the business or
the owner of the market erects or causes his own signs to be
erected. In the latter case, the proprietor of the business or the
owner of the market rents advertising space from those engaged
in the business of erecting and renting outdoor advertising signs.
The Denver Sign Code has attempted to distinguish between these
signs.6 4 This distinction may be based on the case of Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York.6 5 There is no decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court in point on this matter, but its decisions in
other cases would indicate that the distinction is too trivial to be
sustained.
In Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse,66 decided in 1946, involving
the mQtor fuel excise tax statute, a ruling of the director of revenue
63 Id. at 162, 27 Pac. at 1012.
64 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code, § 508.6-10 (2).
65 336 U.S. 106 (1948).





that a two per cent allowance to cover losses caused by evaporation
and spillage should be allowed on fuel shipments from a refinery
but not on fuel shipped from a bulk station, was held unconstitu-
tional. In that decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado, citing other
authorities, said in part:
" 'Equal protection in its guaranty of like treatment to
all similarly situated permits classification which is reason-
able and not arbitrary and which is based upon substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the objects or
persons dealt with and to the public purpose sought to be
achieved by the legislation involved.... In all cases, how-
ever, where a classification is made for the purpose of con-
ferring a special privilege on a class, there must be some
good and valid reason why that particular class should
alone be the recipient of the benefit .... In cases involving
the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the funda-
mental principle involved in classification is that it shall
meet the requirement that it must affect alike all persons
in the same class and under similar conditions.' "61
There is no essential difference between a sign which says,
"Coca-Cola sold here" and an adjacent sign which says, "Coca-Cola
sold next door." Yet, under the Denver Sign Code,68 it is the invisi-
ble property line between the signs, and not the public welfare,
which renders one sign legal and the other illegal.
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court, as if to emphasize its
concern over the pressures for further restrictions upon the use and
enjoyment of private property, said in the 1949 case of Jones v.
Board of Adjustment:69
"We consider briefly some basic fundamentals. The
right to the use and enjoyment of property for lawful pur-
poses is the very essence of the incentive to property owner-
ship. The right to thus use property is a property right
fully protected by the due process clause of the federal and
state Constitutions. The use to which an owner may put
his property is subject to a proper exercise of the police
power.... Thus, under the police power, zoning ordinances
are upheld imposing limitations upon the use of land, pro-
vided, however, that the regulations are reasonable, and
provided further that the restrictions in fact have a sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, or general
welfare.
7 0
"Moreover we are confronted with a further and all-
important legal principle, which is that rule which requires
a strict construction of such an ordinance in favor of the
right of a property owner to an unrestricted use of his
property. We stated in Chamberlain v. Roberts, 81 Colo.
23, 253 Pac. 27: '. . . We consider the rule that the scope of
an ordinance restricting one's powers over his own property
67 Id. at 333-34, 173 P.2d at 215-16.
68 Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, § 508.6-10(2).
69 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
70 Id. at 427, 204 P.2d at 563-64.
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ought not to be extended, but rather restricted by inter-
pretation.' -1
Colorado is a tourist state. Not every one of its scenic or recrea-
tional areas is adjacent to a main highway. Legislation which dis-
tinguishes between signs advertising the product sold or the business
conducted on the premises on which the sign is located and signs
which do not, harms our tourist industry.7 2 Such legislation grants
a preference to those segments of the industry which are located on
main highways and discriminates against those which are not so
favorably situated. Legislation which attempts to distinguish be-
tween signs as accessory to a particular business and the business of
erecting and renting outdoor signs, does a great disservice to the
tourists. Other forms of advertising attempt to direct a tourist to a
particular place by publicizing the address of such place. Frequently
a strange address is meaningless to the tourist, but there is no mis-
taking the simplicity or directness of an outdoor sign which adver-
tises a place of rest or refreshment so many miles distant, with an
arrow or other appropriate directional sign pointing the way.
It would seem from the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado noted above, that a law which prohibits billboards and
outdoor advertising in the commercial and industrial areas of Colo-
rado is unconstitutional. Additionally, it would seem that court
approval would be denied legislation such as Senate Bill 150,71
which, under the pretext of regulation, prohibits all but a few types
of signs along the interstate and primary highways in Colorado.
What may evolve from present discussion on this subject is
legislation similar to that proposed by the advertising industry in
House Bill 469.74 However, before any remedial legislation can be
enacted, the extremists on both sides-those who would prohibit all
outdoor signs and those who profess to see in any sign legislation
the opening wedge for the supervision and control of all rural
activities-must face realities. It is ironic that these opposing
groups have in the past successfully joined efforts to defeat more
effective and workable sign legislation in Colorado.
71 Id. at 429, 204 P.2d at 564-65.
72 E.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958); Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, §
508.6-10 (2).
73 42d Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959).
74 42d Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959).
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the history of work which is associated with it, the
Corporation Act of 19581 was too long and too technical to be flaw-
less. Amendments were found to be necessary during the 1959
session.
2
Following approval of the 1958 act, the Corporation and Busi-
ness Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association, of which
Claude M. Maer, Jr. of Denver was chairman, held several meetings
at which the new act and proposed amendments thereto were con-
1 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958 ch. 32 [hereinafter called the 1958 code].
2 Cola. Sess. Laws 1959 ch. 83 I hereinafter called the amending act].
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sidered. Institutes and panel discussions were held at the annual
meeting of the Colorado Bar Association in Colorado Springs on
October 17, 1958, and in various meetings throughout the state. At
these meetings, a number of proposals for amendments originated.
Other amendments which were made by the legislature in 1959
were adopted from recommendations of the ABA Committee on Cor-
porate Laws in its 1957 Addendum of Revisions to the Model Act.3
Amendments which were merely clarifying or corrective in
nature will not be mentioned. 4 Significant amendments are dis-
cussed according to the order of their arrangement by the Revisor
of Statutes.5
CORPORATE POWERS AND LIMITATIONS
Section 2 of the amending act revised Section 56 of the 1958
code in two principal respects. First, since the purchase by a cor-
poration of its own shares has many aspects of the payment of a
dividend, Section 5 was amended to make it possible for a corpora-
tion to acquire its own shares subject to essentially the same limi-
tations as those governing the payment of dividends under the
provisions of Section 42.7 Thus, Section 42 (d) 8 permits the payment
of dividends out of a corporation's net assets in excess of its stated
capital (with certain exceptions) which is in essence the "surplus"
of the corporation as defined in Section 2 (k).9 This amendment to
Section 5 permits the corporation to acquire its own shares out of
"unreserved and unrestricted surplus," rather than only to the ex-
tent of "earned" or "capital surplus" available therefor.1 0 These
terms of art are defined in the 1958 code in Sections 2 (1), (m), and
(n).11
The second principal change in Section 5 of the 1958 code is to
apply the insolvency restriction of Section 5 (a) 12 (1958 code) to all
corporate purchases of, or payments for, its own shares. Hence the
restriction will apply to purchases by a corporation of its shares to
compromise an indebtedness or to pay dissenting shareholders, and
so forth.
Section 3 of the amending act makes two changes in Section
1113 of the 1958 code as to registered office and registered agent.
First, it requires that domestic or foreign corporations which desire
to act as registered agents must have a specific provision in their
articles of incorporation permitting them to act as resident or
statutory agents. This amendment is intended, among other things,
to prevent a corporation from acting as its own registered agent; a
3 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act (Addendum 1957).
4 Falling into this category are §§ 1 and 13 of the amending act, which amended 4(f) and 87(e) of
the 1958 co e.
5 See 35 DICTA 366 for a table of comparative section numbers. The proposed 1959 Supplement
which the Revisor has prepared for enactment during the 1960 session of the General Assembly follows
the arrangement there shown. Footnote citations are to the proposed 1959 Supplement, and are in-
cluded because of their usefulness after the 1959 Supplement is published.
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-28-2 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-31-10 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-31-10(5) (Proposed Supp. 1959) (this provision is not contained in-the Model
Act).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. * 31-27-2(11) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
10 This amendment was suggested by the ABA-ALI Model Bus. Carp. Act (Addendum 1957), but
does not conform to the entire revision which the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws approved.
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-27-2(11)-(13) (Proposed Supp. 1959). For a discussion of this subject see
Comment, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 49 (1958).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-28-2(4) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-28-10 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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number of corporations have attempted this since the effective date
of the 1958 code.
The second change in Section 11 is to exempt non-profit cor-
porations from the requirements contained in the section. Thus, a
non-profit corporation can act as a registered agent for other
corporations free of the restrictions of Section 11.
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION-AMENDMENTS
Section 9 of the amending act was suggested by the 1957 Adden-
dum of Revisions to the Model Act 14 and amended Section 50 (i)15
of the 1958 code. The amendment merely makes express the author-
ity already granted by the general language in the subsection. This
section, before amendment, provided that the articles of incorpora-
14 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act (Addendum 1957).
15 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-29-2(i) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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tion may contain any provision not inconsistent with law which the
incorporators desire to set forth therein. However, the 1957 Adden-
dum of Revisions proposed giving specific power to include in the
articles any provision restricting the transfer of shares. That revi-
sion was adopted in the amending act. The Colorado Bar Association
Committee recommended that there also be included a correspond-
ing provision which would permit the corporation itself, if em-
powered in the articles, to impose restrictions on the transfers of its
shares. Under this latter provision, restrictions on the transfer of
shares could be imposed by action of the board of directors if gen-
eral provisions permitting such action were included in the articles.
In small, closely held corporations it is often desirable to impose
restrictions on the transfer of shares to maintain ownership in the
family or within the managing group, and this amendment gives
specific sanction to such provisions. That revision also was adopted.
Section 10 amends Sections 5616 of the 1958 code by the addition
of a new clause. The effect of the clause is to give shareholders of
a preferred or special class of stock, not otherwise entitled to vote
on an amendment to the articles of incorporation, the right to vote
as a class on the proposed amendment, if the amendment would
divide their shares into series, or would permit the board of directors
to do so. The original version would allow a vote to the affected
class only if the articles were being amended to set forth specifically
the differences in the rights of the various newly-created series.
This amendment conforms to the recommendations of the 1957
Addendum of Revisions.
Section 25 of the amending act added a new section 17 to the
corporation code, and was requested by the Secretary of State's
office. It is taken from the old law' 8 and requires the Secretary of
State to record and preserve certificates of incorporation and
amendments thereto which, when duly certified, shall be evidence
of the existence of the corporation and prima facie evidence of the
contents of the certificate of incorporation or amendments thereto.
SHAREHOLDERS AND SHARES OF STOCK
Section 4 of the amending act conforms Section 1419 to changes
recommended in the 1957 Addendum of Revisions. By the addition
of a clause, it authorizes a corporation in its articles to limit or deny
the voting rights of "or provide special voting rights for" the shares
of any class to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of the
1958 code.
Section 5 makes substantial revisions in Section 2520 of the 1958
code concerning shareholders' pre-emptive rights and employee stock
plans. Under prior Colorado corporation law, shareholders were not
deemed to have pre-emptive rights in treasury shares. A proviso was
added to the first paragraph of the section in the amending act to
continue this rule as to corporations organized prior to January 1,
1959, the effective date of the new Colorado corporation code. Of
course, if the articles of incorporation of a corporation organized
under the old law specifically gave shareholders pre-emptive rights
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-29-8(i) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
17 Which wil] become Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-29-14 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
18 Colo. Sess. Lows 1945, ch. 102, §1.
19 Colo. Rev. Star. § 31-30-1(1) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-30-10(l) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1959
in treasury shares, the second clause of the proviso continues such
specific rights.
2 1
The second amendment to Section 2522 was intended to continue
the validity without further stockholder action of stock rights, op-
tions, stock bonus and other incentive plans which were lawfully
adopted by corporations under prior Colorado corporation law be-
fore January 1, 1959. It was thought that the wording of the second
paragraph of Section 25 as originally enacted might require the re-
validation or reapproval by stockholders of such plans even though
the plans had been validly adopted prior to the enactment of the
new law.
Unfortunately, a part of the amendatory language was omitted,
so that the clause as enacted and approved reads, "as shall have
been or otherwise lawfully provided for before January 1, 1959."
The omission occurs after the words "shall have been"; the words
"approved by its shareholders" were included in the House amend-
ment,23 but were inadvertently omitted from the engrossed bill and
from the bill signed by the Governor.
It was thought necessary to have the twofold provisions in this
clause ("approved by its shareholders or otherwise lawfully pro-
vided for") because under prior law such stock options and other
similar plans in some corporations could have been approved by
its shareholders and in others legally adopted in some other manner.
In any event, it is hoped that if called upon to do so, the Supreme
Court can by some means divine the "intent" of the legislature in
this instance. An amendment probably will be offered during the
1960 session in connection with the enactment of the 1959 Supple-
ment to restore the missing words.
Section 6 eliminates the "except" clause at the end of Section
2924 of the 1958 code relating to closing of transfer books. The
amendment is one of the 1957 Addendum of Revisions. The effect of
the amendment is apparent from the sentence from which the ex-
ception was stricken. Prior to being stricken it read:
"When a determination of shareholders entitled to vote
at any meeting of shareholders has been made as provided
in this section, such determination shall apply to any ad-
journment thereof except where the determination has been
made through the closing of the stock transfer books and
the stated period of closing has expired."
Section 7 of the amending act amends Section 3325 of the 1958
code to make it clear that a voting trustee need only maintain the
necessary books and records showing the names and addresses of
the holders of interests in the voting trust. The original section
specified that a voting trustee should maintain the same books and
records as required of the corporation. Such duplicate record keep-
ing was not thought necessary.
DIRECTORS--OFFIcERs--RECORDS
Section 8 amends Section 3826 of the 1958 code to limit the
21 See discussion on the subject of pre-emptive rights under the new Colorado corporation code in
Clarke, The New Colorado Corporation Act, 35 DICTA 317, 338-39 (1958).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-30-10(2) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
23 42d Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess., H.R. Jour. 1077 (April 13, 1959).
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-30-13 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
25 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-30-17 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-31-5 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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power of shareholders of pre-1959 corporations to remove classified
directors. A new concept was added to Colorado law in the original
enactment of Section 38, in that removal of the directors of a cor-
poration by a majority vote of the shareholders was specifically
provided in the statute. If a pre-1959 corporation had provided for
classification of directors in its certificate of incorporation, it was
thought appropriate to grant such corporation an added assurance,
so far as continuity in the board of directors is concerned, by pro-
viding that while it would take a majority of shareholders to remove
directors whose terms expire at the next annual meeting, a two-
thirds vote of the shares would be required to remove all directors
in one fell swoop. Holders of a bare majority would have to vote
for removal at least twice to obtain majority control of the board of
such a pre-1959 corporation.
MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
Section 11 amends Section 7127 of the 1958 code to conform to
the recommendations in the 1957 Addendum of Revisions, and per-
mits an abbreviated procedure in the case of the merger of a 95%
owned subsidiary. The change allows a waiver of the thirty-day
waiting period if the holders of all the outstanding stock of the
subsidiary agree. This change further simplifies the merger proced-
ure under these circumstances, but cannot prejudice the rights of
any minority shareholders because all of the stock must agree to
the waiver.
Section 12 amends Section 7328 of the 1958 code to conform to
the recommendations in the 1957 Addendum of Revisions by per-
mitting the abandonment of a merger or consolidation of a domestic
and foreign corporation at any time prior to the filing of the articles
of merger or consolidation with the Secretary of State. A similar
provision is contained in Section 6929 of the 1958 code permitting the
abandonment of a proposed merger or consolidation, under certain
circumstances, of domestic corporations, and the amendment to
Section 73 merely permits a similar procedure in the case of the
merger or consolidation of domestic and foreign corporations.
Section 12 of the amending act also makes a practical change in
Section 7330 by requiring that the Secretary of State be furnished
an address to which the service of process in a merger or consoli-
dation proceeding shall be mailed.
DISSOLUTION-VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
Section 14 of the amending act eliminates the ambiguity in the
paragraph numbering of Section 9031 of the 1958 code and adds
certain language 32 from the Model Act which had been omitted.
The additional provisions permit involuntary dissolution proceed-
ings to be commenced in the district court by a creditor under cer-
tain circumstances, by the corporation itself if it has filed a state-
ment of intent to dissolve and have the liquidation continued under
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-33-6(4) (Proposed Supp. 1959). For a discussion of the new Colorado law
on merger or consolidation, see Comment, 31, Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 66 (1958).
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-33-7 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-33-3(3) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-33-7(3)(c) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-34-13 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
32 Cola. Sess. Laws 1958 ch. 32, §§ 90(2)(b)-(d), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, at 334-35,






)(c), (d), (e)(3), (4) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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the supervision of the court, or by the Attorney General under cer-
tain circumstances. Subsection (5)33 was added at the request of the
Secretary of State to dissolve by operation of law all corporations
which were defunct for at least five years as of January 1, 1959.
This latter provision will permit the Secretary of State to eliminate
from its files many thousands of defunct corporations which have
had no significance for many years.
Section 15 amends Section 9231 of the 1958 code by clarifying
its language. In the original version the section seemed to say that
all actions for involuntary dissolution of a corporatibn shall be com-
menced by the Attorney General, whereas the intent of the original
section was to provide a venue for actions which the Attorney Gen-
eral actually brings. The venue for actions for involuntary dissolu-
tion of a corporation brought by others than the Attorney General
is the county in which the registered office of the corporation is
situated.
3 5
Section 16 amends Section 10036 of the 1958 code, relating to
survival of remedy after dissolution, in several respects. Subsection
(1) makes the application of the section more general by the pro-
vision that it applies in the case of a dissolution "in any manner"
rather than the dissolution under certain specified circumstances as
originally provided. A clause is added at the end of subsection (1)
to exclude the two-year statute of limitations from operation in the
case of any action affecting the title to real estate. Subsection (2)
33 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, at 335.
34 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-34-15 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
35 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32, § 90(3), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, at 335, Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 31-34-13(3) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-34-23 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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was added in its entirety to provide a procedure for the recovery
or disposition by the corporation of any property not disposed of in
the liquidation proceedings. These amendments were proposed and
drafted by the members of the Title Standards Committees of the
Colorado and Denver Bar Associations and provide a workable and
concise solution to the clearing of the title of corporately owned
property not properly disposed of in the liquidation of the corpora-
tion. The somewhat similar, although less exact, provisions on this
subject contained in Section 145 of the original act were repealed
by the amending act.3
7
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Section 17 amends Sections 10131 of the 1958 code by providing
that foreign banking and insurance corporations can come into
Colorado to transact banking and insurance business, only if the
banking or the insurance laws of Colorado will permit such activ-
ities. Also, the amendment provides that foreign banking and in-
surance corporations can come into Colorado under this code and
qualify to conduct any corporate business which a foreign business
corporation is permitted to conduct except the business of banking
or insurance.
Section 18 amends Section 102 39 of the 1958 code to provide that
foreign corporations which qualify to do business in Colorado before
January 1, 1959 and which therefore did not receive a "certificate of
authority under this act" will not be required to obtain such a
certificate in order to enjoy all the powers set forth in their articles
at the time of their qualification prior to January 1, 1959.
Section 19 amends Section 10340 of the 1958 code to make it clear
that foreign corporations can qualify to do business in Colorado
under an assumed name. This change was deemed necessary be-
cause if a foreign corporation were not allowed to use an assumed
name, it could not do business in Colorado if a domestic corporation
already had the name which the foreign corporation desired to use.
This was a fairly common occurrence under prior practice, and there
seemed to be no reason why an opportunity to do business under an
assumed name should not be granted. Section 20 of the amending
act makes a corresponding change in Section 10541 of the 1958 code.
37 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 83, § 26, at 341.
38 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-1 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-4 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
40 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-5 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-7(0)(c) (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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Section 21 amends Section 10642 of the 1958 code to permit a
qualifying foreign corporation to file restated or composite articles
of its incorporation with the Secretary of State of Colorado if the
state of incorporation permits a corporation to have restated or
composite articles.
Section 22 amends Section 10843 of the 1958 code, relating to the
registered office and registered agent of foreign corporations, in a
manner which corresponds to the amendment to Section 11 of the
1958 code which was made by Section 3 of the amending act.
4"
Section 23 of the amending act changed Section 1104" of the
1958 code by adding a section which provides that if a foreign cor-
poration transacts business in Colorado without first having ob-
tained a certificate of authority to do so, such corporation shall be
deemed to have automatically appointed the Secretary of State as
its agent for service of process.46 The court having jurisdiction of
the cause, upon verified motion giving the last known address of
such corporation and stating facts showing that it transacted busi-
ness in Colorado, may ex parte authorize service to be made upon
the Secretary of State. The statement of facts should be in sufficient
detail to make out a prima facie case of transacting business based
on prior case law.4 7 Since the matter is jurisdictional and can be
raised at any time, it would seem that a foreign corporation would
not be prejudiced by such a prima facie showing. If, on the other
hand, the foreign corporation appears specially with a motion to
quash the summons and complaint on the ground that it does not
transact business in Colorado, a full-fledged argument on the juris-
dictional issue would be made at that point and it would seem
unduly burdensome on the plaintiff to require him to present a
prima facie case to the court in the first instance. The Secretary of
State is required to send notice of such service to the foreign cor-
poration at its last known address and to file with the clerk of the
court a certificate showing such mailing. Service is complete when
such certificate is filed with the clerk.
Section 24 of the amending act revised Section 11948 of the 1958
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-8 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
43 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-35-17 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
44 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
45 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31.35-19 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
46 The language of the amendment is substantially the same as Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, at 301,
codified as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-10-2(6) (Supp. 1957).
47 See 35 Dicta 360 n. 244 (1958) for a discussion of Colorado cases.
48 Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 31-35-3 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
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code, making it clear that any bona fide successor or assignee of a
foreign corporation may sue on a claim arising out of the transaction
of business in this state by such foreign corporation even though it
did not qualify to transact business in the state. However, the
amendment provides that a foreign corporation cannot avoid the
necessity of qualifying to transact business by merely assigning
such a claim to its nominee or agent.
REPEALED
Section 26 of the amending act repealed the following sections
or subsections of the 1958 code:
Sections 12 (g) and 109 (g), which required a change of
registered office or registered agent of domestic or foreign
corporations to be authorized by resolution duly adopted by
the board of directors.
Section 116 (f), which authorized the Secretary of State
to revoke the certificate of authority of a foreign corpora-
tion if the corporation has been defunct for a period of five
years.
Section 145, relating to the title of property on dissolu-
tion. Repeal of this section was required by reason of the
amendment to Section 100 of the 1958 code which is dis-
cussed in connection with Section 16 of the amending act.
49
ERRATUM: In 35 DICTA 339 (1958) it is stated that the require.
ment for publication for notice of meeting of share-
holders in the present law will be dropped. The excep.
tion contained in Colo. Rdv. Stat. § 31-12-3 (1953),
relating to mining companies, should have been noted.
49 At text accompanying note 37 supra.
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INFORMATIVE OPINION A OF 1959
ESTATE PLANNING
Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
of the American Bar Association
This Committee has received inquiries concerning the propriety
of the conduct of corporations and individuals who are not lawyers
but who, through advertisements, brochures, orally or otherwise,
solicit legal work or hold themselves out to the public as being
available to give legal assistance in the field of estate planning or
to do the whole job of planning an estate.
The phrase "estate planning" has come into existence in recent
years to refer to the orderly arrangement of an individual's assets
so as to provide most effectively for the economic needs of himself
while living and of those dependent upon him after his death. At
the outset it should be recognized that there are certain lay activ-
ities which are legitimate aspects of estate planning and which do
not involve legal work, but which are in the nature of an analysis
of the facts and assets of an estate in relation to economic needs,
and may extend to giving general information as to laws affecting
-the disposition of estates, though without any specific application
thereof to a particular estate or individual situation. These activ-
"ities may be properly performed by persons who are not lawyers,
and are discussed later in this opinion. In general, however, pursued
to its proper conclusion, estate planning necessarily involves the
application of legal principles of the law of wills and decedents'
estates, the law of trusts and future interests, the law of real and
personal property, the law of taxation, practice in the Probate and
Chancery Courts, or other fields of law. When such is the case, the
work involved in estate planning includes legal research, the giving
of legal advice or the drafting of legal instruments.
There can thus be no question that estate planning, except
where it is in the nature of an analysis of the facts and assets of an
estate as above described, involves legal work and constitutes the
practice of law. When engaged in by an individual who is not a
lawyer, or by a corporation, it is the unauthorized practice of law.
I Nor does it become any the less the practice of law because the sug-
gYestion is made that the legal advice given or legal work done
should be reviewed by an attorney. It is well settled that both cor-
porations and laymen are prohibited from practicing law directly,
land that they may not practice law indirectly by hiring lawyers to
'practice law for them. Accordingly, neither corporations nor lay-
,men may engage in estate planning by soliciting the legal work
,involved and then hiring lawyers to perform it. This is also the
$unauthorized practice of law. In addition, under Canon 47 of theICanons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association no
Ilawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used
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in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by
any lay agency, personal or corporate.
It is elementary that under Canon 27 lawyers are forbidden to
solicit legal employment by circulars, advertisements, or otherwise.
Thus, no lawyer may solicit legal work in the field of estate plan-
ning or be employed to do such work for a corporation or a layman
which does. But the public could not be protected by prohibiting the
lawyer from soliciting legal work in the field of estate planning, if
at the same time laymen and lay agencies were permitted, in any
guise, to advertise a claimed legal competence in this field. It should
be clear, therefore, that the holding out by any lay agency to the
public, directly or indirectly, overtly or subtly, of its willingness to
perform legal services in the field of estate planning is itself the
unauthorized practice of law. Also, no lay agency may hold itself
out to the public as willing to do the whole job of "estate planning"
without becoming engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
In addition, the lawyer-client relationship requires a duty of
absolute loyalty to the client, and undivided allegiance. Under
Canons 6 and 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics the lawyer
cannot permit his professional services to be controlled or exploited
by a lay agency intervening between him and his client.
Also, under Canon 34 lawyers may not divide fees with laymen,
and this principle applies to fees for legal work in the field of estate
planning. Moreover, the sharing by a layman of a lawyer's fees
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Illustrative of the treatment of the subject in the Courts is the
decision of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in Chicago
Bar Association v. Financial Planning, Inc.,* decided March 21, 1958,
in which the court held that certain estate planning services in-
volved the giving of "legal advice on some of the most important
problems which can arise during a man's lifetime and after his
death," adding that "Even if this advice were confined to tax savings
alone, it still would amount to the practice of law * * *" and "the
contention that the advice is comprised merely of suggestions, and
is always subject to be reviewed by a lawyer, is no excuse for the
conduct of the defendants. The practice of law should be confined
to lawyers without the interposition of unauthorized practitioners
who solicit this business directly or indirectly."






The decree in this case permanently enjoined the defendants,
their agents and employees from:
"(a) Giving legal counsel and advice,
(b) Rendering legal opinions,
(c) Preparing, drafting and construing legal docu-
ments,
(d) Preparing estate plans which embody legal anal-
ysis, counsel and advice,
(e) Holding themselves out as persons who prepare
estate plans embodying legal analysis, counsel and advice,
(f) Charging and collecting fees for legal counsel, ad-
vice, or services rendered by them, or their agents, or
employees,
(g) From practicing law in any form, or holding them-
selves out as having a right to practice law, or soliciting
employment to prepare estate plans embodying legal anal-
ysis, counsel and advice, or from charging, or collecting fees,
or payments for legal services rendered by said defendants
and each of them or their agents, or employees."
It is not intended by the opinion of this Committee to proscribe
activities of those groups which serve various fields related to estate
planning unless they involve the performance of legal services as
outlined herein. Activities geared to motivating the individual con-
cerned to do something about his affairs and to seek the advice of
his own lawyer as early as possible, preferably from the outset, with
regard to the development of an overall estate plan, are in the public
interest. Advice on matters of law with respect to the prospect's
particular factual situation, however, must not be given.
The activities of lay groups described above should conform to
the standards of propriety set forth in the several Statements of
Principles developed through the Conference method between the
American Bar Association and various business and professional
groups. Moreover, because of the shadowy borderline between an
analysis of facts and assets of an estate and the application of legal
principles to them, it is clearly within the spirit of the several
Statements of Principles that the activities of these groups should
be performed in close cooperation with the client's own attorney.
It is contemplated that any disputes which may arise with respect to
the activities of such business and professional groups shall be gov-
erned by such Statement of Principles. The understandings reached
in these Principles have served to encourage the public to seek
proper legal guidance, the lay groups not to transgress upon the
sphere of activity properly reserved for the legal profession, and to
bring about better understanding and cooperation between those
groups and the Bar.
SA[HS-LIULOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS- ILPIE 5-3422
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TWELVE STEPS TO PROSPERITY
An address delivered at the 1959 Annual Convention of the
Colorado Bar Association by Philip S. Habermann,
Executive Director, State Bar of Wisconsin
The moral for today's message is, "The gods help them who help
themselves." The source of that quotation is Aesop's Fables, 550 B.C.,
and that is about as far back as you can go for authority. This prov-
erb is as timely today as then, and the point of all this is that if we
lawyers want to improve our economic situation, we have to stop
sitting on our hands and get busy helping ourselves.
The first thing to do is to stop feeling sorry for ourselves and
envying the doctors. Any troubles we have are due largely to our
own neglect. I haven't seen any starving lawyers, but as a profes-
sion we have fallen far behind economically. For the training you
have and for the time expended, lawyers are reasonably entitled to
a substantially improved economic picture, and without having to
work a 60-hour week to get it. It is incongrous that the bar, edu-
cated and trained better than ever before, is suffering from inflation
in the midst of the greatest prosperity for others that this country
has ever known.
Secondly, you must establish a definite goal or objective. It is
my opinion that with reasonable but concerted effort, individually
and as an organized bar, you can achieve a 10% a year increase in
lawyers' incomes for the next ten years. That is a fair goal, and one
that would regain the ground lost since 1929.
How do you go about it? What can you do? For that, I suggest
a 12 point program. Some of it is up to you individually. Some of
it must be done by your organized bar. But if you all set your sights
on this goal, and all work at it year in and year out, you can't fail.
And it takes work, not money, to reach this goal.
These 12 steps are nothing new. Some of them you may now be
doing. Collectively, the results achievable are distinctly worthwhile.
But remember, you have to set your sights on a goal of some sort.
1. Fee Schedule
First, you have to have a realistic schedule of charges, prefer-
ably in the form of a minimum fee schedule. More than that, you
have to live up to it, and see that the chiselers don't under-cut you.
Now I am not going to recite all the platitudes about law being
a profession and not a trade, that it is a way of life and not to riches,
et cetera. Furthermore, I assume that you all know the provisions of
Canon 12 setting forth the elements on which legal fees are to be
based.
I am assuming that you all are familiar with all of that, and
that what you really seek is a workable, realistic basis on which you
can render your services for an adequate fee that will afford you the
living your training and profession merits. This fee must recognize
that the legal profession has no call upon the general public for its




You all know that your law income comes from four types of
work:
1) The contingent fee cases
2) The retainer contracts
3) The standard-price jobs, such as probate, and
4) The vast variety of work where you are entitled to
a professional fee based on time and the other
elements involved.
Now no minimum fee schedule will solve all your problems, but
it will greatly standarize and up-grade your charges for all of these
classes of work and particularly for the set-fee jobs. If properly
drafted, it will give the attorney the basis on which to charge and
justify the charge if need be.
Let me emphasize that to be really effective your fee schedule
must go into considerable detail on individual items, and must cover
most items. Moreover, you probably need to abandon an ill-con-
ceived concept of fee development. Most fee schedules need a new
look. All too often we have been guided by
1) An ignorance of our income requirements
2) A guess as to the client's ability to pay, and
3) A fear of what the competition is likely to charge.
No wonder lawyers are hesitant when asked what their fees are and
defensive when they state them!
I know that we could debate fees and charges and fee schedules
for at least a week. The point is that every lawyer has to be made
to realize that the day of the $5.00 will is long-gone. A lawyer is
entitled to a professional fee, not just an hourly charge, and he is
entitled to have his brother lawyer's support in charging it. A fee
schedule that properly reflects today's high office overhead and will
produce an adequate fee to yield a professional man's income will go
a long way towards offsetting the effect of inflation on the practice
of law.
Lawyers stood still while the others moved on ahead. Do you
realize that the day of the $10,000 a year craftsman is nearly here,
if not here now? I'll venture that in Denver there are tradesmen-
plumbers, bricklayers or electricians-that draw $4.50 an hour in
pay and fringe benefits. Without overtime, that is $9,000 a year!
And believe me, those boys aren't around apologizing for what
they charge. They are proud of it.
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I am personally convinced that the promulgation and enforce-
ment of an advisory schedule of minimum fees will do more than
any other single thing to improve your income.
Enforcement is a problem, of course. It takes some "selling",
both inside and outside of the profession. For the consistent under-
cutter, you should apply ethical sanctions.
2. Cost Accounting
The second step is to apply the basic elements of cost accounting
to the law office. This is directly related to the setting of realistic
charges and the keeping of adequate time records, about which you
have all heard recently.
To date, lawyers have ignored the obvious fact that no business
can operate effectively unless it knows its cost of doing business.
The gasoline station and the grocery store on the corner know
exactly what their products cost, what their overhead is, and what
mark-up they must add to make a living. But do you know what it
costs you to draw a will or probate an estate? Do you make or lose
money on your contingent fee cases? Do you even know what it
costs per hour or day to keep your office open? What is your annual
operating cost before there is one cent for your pocket? It is easy
to find out.
This is directly related to fee charges. You simply have to re-
cover your costs plus whatever amount you are to have for yourself,
on the average, for all the work you do. If you don't, you'll go broke.
If you want to take home $14,000 a year, and your overhead is
$6,000, then you have to average $16.67 an hour for the 1200 hours a
year that you can charge up to a client. That 1200 hour figure is
about all the charge hours the average lawyer can produce in a year.
Now I want to emphasize and re-emphasize two things:
1) Probably 50% of all Colorado lawyers are not now
keeping time records. Don't be frightened about
them. It is not complicated.
2) I am not advocating time records so that you can
charge for all your work on the basis of the time
spent. I am emphasizing the absolute necessity,
however, of knowing how much time you put in on
every matter and on every part of your practice.
Until you know this, you are simply flying blind.
And time is certainly an essential factor in setting
a fee in a non-standard job.
3) If you don't recover your costs, you are:
a) Running a discount house, or
b) Taking too many uneconomic cases, or
c) Just plain inefficient; or all three!
What I am trying to say is that you have .to know your cost of
doing business, and you have to keep time records to know what
your various types of work are producing. And the time and costs
must be reflected in your fee charges.
3. Specialization
I believe that specialization of lawyers is going to come soon,
and we should begin now to get ready for it. The medical world is
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split into dozens of specialties and anything serious requires the
attention of at least two, and often more, of the doctors. It isn't only
that this results in more income, but it results in more efficiency,
and our public will pay for what they get.
If we have to have a cerebral operation on a loved one, we are
not going to encourage the diagnostician to do it himself. And we
are willing to pay for skills. The skilled trial lawyer in tackling an
anti-trust case, or an SEC registration or a complex tax case is get-
ting into a job like the cerebral operation, and so is the tax practi-
tioner who would attempt to try a negligence case. Yet such is done
every day all over Colorado.
The statistics show that among the lawyers the greater rewards
go to the individual in proportion to the size of his firm. The people
in the larger firms are not necessarily smarter, but everyone knows
they do specialize informally. Within a large office several men do
little else in their whole lives but taxes. One man lives happily
among his bond indentures. Other men do real estate, while another
team handles bank work, and so on. Could that not be the reason
in large part for the universally better financial yields of firm
members, compared to individual practitioners?
The American Bar Association now frowns on specialization, I
know. That means we cannot put a specialty on our cards or doors
or stationery without violating the solicitation or advertising canon.
There is some current agitation to change that. The firms and attor-
neys I have described don't violate these rules. They just assign
work that way, and get the results.
No breaking down of the rule is here advocated, as long as the
admission to the specialty is self-judged. The abuses and the varie-
ties of specialization would run away at a gallop.
But every medical specialty has to be recognized by the Ameri-
can Medical Association first, and then has its own academy for
making examinations and admissions.
When the individual and small firm lawyers want to measure
up in income to the doctors or even to their brethren in the large
firms, let them move on the American Bar Association with a pro-
gram, not just to permit specialties on the letterheads or calling
cards, but to establish standards of admission to the specialties.
Then the specialization will mean something worthwhile for the
Best Wishes to the Bar Association
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public and the lawyer will be worthy to demand the corresponding
rewards; and quite likely will receive them.
4. Modernization of Law Offices
Lawyers must give more attention to their law offices. Not only
is a comfortable, attractive and efficient office an aid to doing better
work, but more important, it impresses the client.
You can't work at top efficiency in physical surroundings which
are inconvenient or distracting. Inadequate lighting, inadequate
ventilation, noise, the "few extra steps" per day that an improper
layout entails, all take their toll in time and money. A properly
.designed office means greater economy of operation, increased pro-
ductivity for lawyer and staff, and creates for the client a welcome
impression of stability, prosperity and know-how.
Certain features are common to all well-planned offices, such
as clean aisles and corridors for easy access to every part of the
office, work areas of adequate size and equipment and reference
materials readily accessible to the personnel. In larger firms, some
centralization of facilities in mutually convenient locations will be
necessary and appropriate.
Additional features include secretarial and other work stations
separated from reception areas and shielded from the main stream
of office traffic. If a secretary doubles as receptionist, give her
privacy so that she may carry on her duties without unnecessary
interruption from waiting clients or disturbance to them. Privacy
for the lawyer is an obvious necessity and his office ought to be
adequately soundproofed.
With space at a premium, the large private office is a luxury
few can afford. Scale your offices to accommodate only the number
of people with whom you usually confer and avoid the expense of
seldom utilized space.
An area may be designed as a conference room to accommodate
larger groups. Since such a room often houses library facilities,
folding partitions may be installed to permit library work to con-
tinue in one part while conferences are in progress in the other.
Every consideration should be given to making the lawyer's
office a comfortable place for himself and his staff, since he spends
approximately one-third of his time there. Air conditioning equip-
ment will prove a worthwhile investment. Similarly, adequate
heating and ventilation, and adequate lighting are absolute neces-
sities. Posture chairs for secretarial workers and comfortable seat-
ing for the lawyer are great aids to productivity.
There is an increasing trend toward the construction of profes-
sional buildings for occupancy by one or more lawyers as well as
toward modern redesign and refurnishing of existing quarters. All
of the Wisconsin lawyers who have built their own offices, without
exception have said: "Why did I wait so long!" The effect on their
practice is far beyond their expectations. Most important, they now
have ample parking for themselves and their clients. Today that is
very important.
An attractive office brings business and is an asset which no
NOVEmBER-DECEMBER 1959
lawyer can afford to ignore. It reflects credit upon his professional
position and his business abilities.
5. Mechanization and Equipment
We must strive to decrease overhead costs. One of the most
effective means is to make ourselves and our offices and staffs more
efficient through the installation of modern equipment and ma-
chinery. These include such obvious items of modern equipment as:
1. electric typewriters
2. electric dictating equipment
3. copying machines
4. electrical duplicating equipment
5. tape recorders
6. telephone or intercom systems
7. modern filing equipment
I will not dwell extensively on these pieces of equipment now,
for most of you have received the detailed booklet issued by the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Economics of the
Bar entitled "Modern Equipment Makes the Lawyer Money." I urge
you to read it carefully, for it is going to put dollars in your pockets.
Suffice it to say that I do not understand how any law office
can operate in this day and age without a good copying machine
both for copying and as an aid in drafting. The obvious advantages
of electric typewriters and dictating equipment are many, but this is
fully covered in the booklet just mentioned.-
6. Forms of Doing Business
Over and over surveys show conclusively that the lawyers
practicing in partnerships make more money than those practicing
alone. Whether this is because the better lawyers tend to form
partnerships, or that partnerships are more efficient, can be argued.
I suspect that it is a bit of both, but there is no doubt about the
efficiency angle.
The facts and figures are rather amazing. As you might suspect,
more than one-half of the lawyers practice alone. Yet the earnings
of lawyers increase substantially after they organize into firms.
Lawyers having one partner make over one-third more than lawyers
practicing solo make. Lawyers with two partners make nearly twice
as much as lone practitioners. Lawyers with three partners make
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more than twice as much as the lone practitioners; and lawyers in
firms with four to seven partners make nearly three times as much.
Now don't think if you run out and get yourself six partners
your financial problems are solved. The point is that the figures
do conclusively show lawyers do better financially with a partner
than without one. There are a number of sound reasons for this.
Moreover, partnership income is almost always more stable than
that of the solo lawyer.
There are many advantages other than financial in having at
least one partner. These include the ability to handle matters for
clients more promptly, especially during the absence of one of the
partners for vacations, illness, or work in court. Very important is
the advantage of being able to discuss the problems as they arise
from day to day with your partners. Two or three or four heads
are definitely better than one. Teamwork is always inspiring for
the best efforts.
And then, there is the matter of specialization which I men-
tioned before. Even in the smallest of partnerships you can have a
fair and equitable division of work which is in a sense specialization.
In the four and five man partnerships or larger this can be worked
out to great advantage for both lawyer and client.
Of course, there are some disadvantages in a law partnership.
Most of the reluctance comes from a spirit of independence and a
fear that the other partner or partners will get a greater benefit
out of the arrangement and that it will not work out evenly. But
you know better than I do that a partnership is not necessarily a
50-50 proposition. There are many alternative arrangements which
are eminently fair to each of the partners as to division of net
income and responsibility. You can tailor up just about any sort of
an agreement you want. All sorts of variations of partnerships are
in use in one form or the other all over the country. The thing to
emphasize is that the advantages of law partnerships are real and
the disadvantages can be greatly minimized by sensibly drafted,
flexible partnership agreements, carefully thought out and agreed
upon to fit the needs of the two or three or four men involved.
Within the next few months there will be distributed by the
Committee on Economics of the Bar of the American Bar Associa-
tion to every member of the ABA a splendid booklet on law office
partnerships. The initial draft is being prepared by Paul Carrington
of Dallas, and is based upon his broad experience in this field and
upon more than 100 examples of law office partnership agreements
recently procured from leading law offices throughout the country.
This booklet will be invaluable and I urge you to pay great atten-
tion to its recommendations.
7. Office Systems
Days could be spent on the subject of office systems alone. That
includes your staff organization, your accounting system, your filing
system, your personnel plan and all of the things surrounding you




First, it is essential that you have an orderly system of some
sort. Don't make it too complicated.
Second, remember that any good system is based upon the
principle of intelligent laziness. This principle tells us to do a thing
once, to do it completely, and then not bother with it any more.
Obviously, the basic system in your office should be built
around functions and not individuals. People come and go but the
system should continue on and on.
It is essential that you have an adequate accounting system.
This is especially true because of the trust accounts that a lawyer
handles and the necessity of keeping accurate records for both the
clients records and the lawyer's own purposes. Yet you would be
astounded at the inadequate and antiquated systems, which are
usually homemade systems, now in use by many lawyers.
Of course, the accounting system should tie in very closely with
the office record system, and should produce the figures needed to
reflect the cost accounting data I mentioned before. Not only will
an efficient accounting system reduce the amount of copying work
and bookkeeping required, but it will pay big dividends to you in
prompt collections and more adequate records for your income tax
purposes. Furthermore, it will show you whether you are operating
efficiently.
Time does not permit discussion of an adequate filing system,
a tickler file, office memorandum and opinion file and the like.
Again, there are many good, simple recommended systems, such as
that set forth in the "Practical Lawyer" of November, 1956. Just be
sure that you understand your system, that it is simple and work-
able, that it will produce what you want when you want it, and
that it can grow.
Even the smallest office has need for an office manual contain-
ing some of the personnel policies, rules and regulations.
You can also save considerabie time and effort from your own
work and spend less hours per task if you will routinize and stand-
ardize to the maximum extent. This means that you must preserve
your best efforts in the form of opinions, memorandums and drafts
so that you can copy from them. You must use "boiler plate" or
standard clauses in drafting wills, corporate charters and other
documents. You must prepare and use adequate check lists to cut
down your time and effort. You can use your copy machine as an
aid in drafting. All of these things make you more efficient per-
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sonally, which means that you come up with more legal fees at
the end of the week.
Remember, improved efficiency is one certain way of increasing
your net income. Modernized office procedures and systems are a
sure-fire way to improve your office efficiency. Organize your
office so that you can delegate to your stenographer or subordinate
those things that you can not afford to do yourself, like bookkeeping,
filing, answering the telephone and a lot of other things. And don't
forget the principle of intelligent laziness: do it once, do it right,
and then don't bother about it any more.
8. Post-Graduate Lawyer Training
Both your state bar and your local bar associations have an
important and expanding job in the field of post-graduate legal edu-
cation. This program is directed primarily at refresher courses for
the practicing lawyer and to give him the "how to do it" aspects
of the law practice. This will better equip the lawyer and enable
him to do the job more speedily.
In all of this your law schools will cooperate, but the post-
graduate legal training is primarily a responsibility of the organized
bar. I recognize that you have a problem in a state where you have
vast distances and a widely scattered lawyer population. Yet it is
something that is so worth doing that I am certain an expanded
program, at a high level of instruction, will meet with such a re-
sponse that the bar will fully support the undertaking. For example,
try a series of Saturday law forums during the winter and spring,
emphasizing practical law problems. The goal should be to make
these post-graduate institutes so useful and so instructive that no
lawyer dares to stay away.
As a corollary to this, I might suggest that the bar should estab-
lish liaison with your law schools, to insist that the law schools
carry something on their curricula in the field of legal economics
and office management. You may also desire to argue for certain
practice courses, and for more selective entrance requirements to
the law school. We hear repeatedly that there are too many people
being admitted to the bar who aren't capable of being good lawyers
and not enough people being admitted who will be good lawyers.
This is a problem of the bar as well as of the law schools.
The need for better post-graduate and regular legal education
is a corollary to our efforts to stamp out unauthorized practice of
law and prevent encroachment. We need better post-graduate and
regular legal education so that we are in fact better equipped to do
the job than are the lay people accused of unauthorized practice.
I am ashamed to say that this isn't always so.
9. Unauthorized Practice of Law
It is trite to say "we must be vigilant and militant to uncover
and stamp out the unauthorized practice of law." It has been, is and
will be a problem and I don't know of a better way of putting it.
Lawyers have slept at the switch while lay persons of every
description encroached on our legal practice. We have been too




Let some fellow cut his poor neighbor's kids' hair and charge
50¢ for it, and the state barber inspector will haul him into court
pronto. The court will fine him $50.00 for barbering without a li-
cense and the public applauds. The worst that could happen would
be a kid with a lousy haircut which would grow out in three weeks.
Yet if some notary draws a will and charges $5.00 for it, we are apt
to shrug it off as not too important, even though he botches the job
and some poor guy loses an inheritance.
We must also disabuse people of the erroneous impression that
it is perfectly all right for a layman to do legal work so long as he
makes no charge for it. Legal work is legal work, whether for free
or for a charge. This is a strange attitude, too, for no one would
ever claim it okay for a non-doctor to operate or a non-dentist to
make false teeth so long as they didn't charge.
My plea is this: support your committee on unauthorized prac-
tice of law, both financially and in spirit. Hire a special investigator,
if you can, to police the situation. Enlist the active assistance of
your state attorney general and your county attorneys. Don't yield
another inch to lay agencies. Try to regain some of the practice
you have lost. And most of all, educate every member of your bar
to the problem and end the complacency that is too often found.
Here is one case where "what you don't know" will hurt you!
Your bar association must play a part here. It should encourage
the reporting of instances of unauthorized practice, and work out
treaties with other groups and then enforce them.
10. Stronger Bar Associations
I know it is not necessary for me to urge upon you the impor-
tance of stronger bar associations. Certainly if we are to have high-
er professional standards and a stronger profession we must have
and will have stronger and more active bar associations. What law-
yers pay in dues to their own professional organizations is peanuts
compared to what many other groups pay. But if we can improve
the lawyer's economic status, he can and will pay higher dues, and
gladly.
Since your state association can be no stronger than the sum
total of your local associations, I urge you to place special emphasis
on encouraging more activity at the local bar level. That is where
law is practiced, and where the problems arise. If the local bar
associations are well organized and active, the state association is
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all the more effective and able to do the things that it must do to
increase the professional status of the lawyer, and his economic
position as well.
Your state bar should encourage the activity of your special
committee on economics of law practice. It should actively search
for new methods of helping the lawyer in his practice-to "look for
the better mousetrap." It should encourage and finance experiments
in the preparation and development of new techniques. More im-
portant, it should disseminate and recommend to every lawyer these
important findings and developments.
11. Public Relations
You all appreciate the importance of good, continuous public
relations efforts on behalf of the organized bar as well as the indi-
vidual lawyer. I am not going to dwell upon the general aspects of
it at this time. Good public relations are essential to a prosperous,
well-governed bar, and I know that you are and have been working
in this field.
There are three specific aspects of public relations which can
and should be emphasized. These will be especially important in
increasing the economic well-being of the lawyers.
The first is some sort of client security fund. This is a "hot
potato" and in fact, my own Wisconsin bar turned the matter down
last summer. Nevertheless, like many new ideas of merit, this one
is going to catch hold in some form or other and within the next
decade most bar associations will afford to the public some sort of
guarantee that any client who suffers a pecuniary loss by a dis-
honest lawyer will be reimbursed. Several states now have a plan.
Others are actively considering some type of program now. At least,
keep an open mind on the matter and see what develops, how much
it costs and what the results are. It can be a wonderful public rela-
tions tool.
The second is to place greater emphasis on preventive law.
Largely this is a matter of educating the public to the matter of
legal service. The medical and dental professions have done it with
scare techniques and "see your dentist once a year" programs. We
lawyers must give extra emphasis to bar association efforts in con-
ducting newspaper columns, public forums, law-in-the-high-school
courses, and the like which educate the people to be aware of their
legal problems and the fact that a solution is readily available.
This preventive law program is a "natural" for any bar public rela-
tions program, and it will pay big dividends. Particularly I urge
you to concentrate your efforts on the high school courses, the farm
groups and the women. They are the most receptive to this sort of
public relations.
Third, and this is somewhat tied in with preventive law, the
idea of the "annual legal check-up," pioneered by the Michigan Bar,
should be considered. With some modifications and adaptations to
your local bar needs, this idea can do a great deal to make clients




Enough for public relations. But remember, you must all work
on it, all the time!
12. Selling the Client
The good client is a happy client. Yet far too many lawyers
are complete washouts in their relations with clients. Probably
more otherwise intelligent lawyers are economic failures because of
a lack of understanding of psychology than for any other single
reason. This is no place for a lecture on client psychology, motiva-
tion, and manners, but I recommend that on some bar program you
have somebody really lay it on the line for you on this subject.
For now, I will point out several things that you should keep
in mind. Try to apply them every day with every client.
1. Talk English. Let the client know what is going on and
what is going to happen. Answer his questions and spend enough
time at the first conference to be sure that the client understands
what the case is about, what the probabilities are, and perhaps some-
thing about what it will cost him.
2. Practice law in your office. Make your office your work-
shop, and not your home, the court house, or the country club. It
gives you professional dignity, and that is where your working tools
and facilities are.
3. Let the client know that you are working. The biggest
single complaint about lawyers is that they "are so darned slow."
One of the reasons for this is that, while many legal matters neces-
sarily take a long time, lawyers do not keep their clients advised
as to what work they are doing, how it is progressing, and what is
going on. This can easily be done by an occasional letter, or copies
of appropriate pleadings, correspondence, and the like.
4. Mention expense. If not done at the initial conference, be
sure that at some point your client understands his responsibility
for costs and disbursements, as well as for legal fees. That softens
the impact and makes the final bill more understandable.
5. Make court appearances easier. Remember, most clients are
scared to death of going to court. They are paralyzed on the witness
stand, and fearful of being torn apart by the opposing counsel.
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Spend a little time telling them what will happen, how to act, and
give them some reassurance.
6. Develop a genuine interest. To the client, his lawsuit is of
No. 1 importance. He likes to think that it is equally important
to you.
7. Prompt billing. Again, this is the subject for an entire talk,
which I recommend highly. The hardest working lawyer in Colo-
rado will go broke if he doesn't bill and collect his fees. Prompt
billing and proper billing are essential ingredients in keeping clients
happy. In some cases, partial billings during the course of the mat-
ter are advisable. In any case, use common sense and some detail
and psychology in writing your bill, or otherwise you may win the
lawsuit and collect your fee but lose a client forever.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by repeating what Aesop said in 550 B.C.-
"The gods help them who help themselves."
Twelve ways that you can help yourselves are:
1. Minimum fee schedules, adopted and lived up to.
2. Application of cost accounting principles to the law
office.
3. Specialization of lawyers.
4. Modernization of law offices.
5. Mechanization and better equipment.
6. Organization of law partnerships.
7. Improved office systems.
8. Increased post-graduate legal training.
9. Reducing the unauthorized practice of law.
10. Stronger local and state bar associations.
11. New fields of public relations.
12. Sell the clients and keep them happy.
You can't do all of these things all at once. But you need a
program and a goal and if you set the goal and all work on it, I
predict that in ten years (if not before) your net income can be
doubled. And if you must pick one point to start on, and if I can
do no more than convince you to begin to keep time and cost
records now, you are off to a good start.
I am only sorry that I can't leave with you some single, tangible
solution that will put you on easy street overnight. Instead, I'll have
to console you by quoting that famous saying, "half the fun is in
the chase."
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